University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1981

Taiping Rebellion and Sino-British relations, 1850-1864
Margaret E. Hendershot
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Hendershot, Margaret E., "Taiping Rebellion and Sino-British relations, 1850-1864" (1981). Graduate
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 3837.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3837

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

COPYRIGHT

ACT OF 1976

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT IN WHICH COPYRIGHT SUB
SISTS . ANY FURTHER REPRINTING OF ITS CONTENTS MUST BE APPROVED
BY THE AUTHOR,
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY^FJIONTANA
OATF : '
19 81

THE TAIPING KSB3SLLI0H AND SENO-BRITISH
RELATIONS, 1850-1864

By
Margaret E, Hendershot

B.A.j University of Montana. 1977

Presented in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1981

Approved:

Chairman a Board of Examiners

Graduate School

-JsJtrSl
Date

UMI Number: EP34449

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
Dissertation Publishing

UMI EP34449
Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

ABSTRACT

Hendershot, Margaret E., M.A., Spring 1981

History

The Taiping Rebellion and Sino-British Relations, 1850-1864
(122 pp.)
Director:

Robert R. Dozier

This work is an analysis of the Taiping Rebellion's influence
upon the formation of British policy toward the Imperial govern
ment of China, 1850 to 1864. Documentation for the work consists
primarily of the British Foreign Office correspondence on China.
The Taiping Rebellion largely, but not exclusively, determined
British attitudes and conduct toward the Imperial authorities.
The circumstances which led to the change in China's foreign
policy in turn influenced the British response to the Chinese
government. The alteration of Sino-British relations that
resulted from the Taiping Rebellion exemplified "informal" Brit
ish imperialism, and perfectly fitted Britain's Free Trade
interests.
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IKTRO'DUGTION

In the nineteenth centuryt the power of the enfeebled Ch'ing
dynasty continued to decline.

The government failed to resolve the

social, economic, and political problems which arose during a century of
rapid change,

Western trading nations brought goods, ideas, laws, and

technology disturbing to the Middle Kingdom, which worsened China's
internal disruption.

Amidst the confusion of change? the Taiping rebels

instigated a civil war.

The coincidence of the Taiping Rebellion and

the growth of foreign influence in China indicated the exhaustion of
the Ch'ing government, and .led to the breakdown of the Confucian polity.
Dynasties of China, frequently came to power through conquest; the
Ch'ing were Kanchus, a racial minority Kfao conquered China in 1644. To
rule China the government required a large retinue cf bureaucrats to
assist in administration.

Alth.ough Kan Chinese considered the Manchus

an alien or "barbarian" dynasty, they served the Giving government, 'Hie
Manchus instituted many discriminatory practices which made them obnox
ious to their subjects.

The Manchu-style queue worn by all males was

only one syvfool of Chinese servitude.

The governmental "hierarchy

consisted of Manchu princes, noblemen and. bannermen, all of whom were a
charge on public funds. . , . Imperial clansmen could only be tided by
their peers; Manchus in general could only be tried by Manchus. . . .
There were separate codes of law for different races. . .. .Trie
Manchus also systematically rotated district officials to guard against
J.

2
A
disruptive localism,

While the Manchus attempted to utilize Chinese

institutions, their exclusive and authoritarian policies proved divisive,,
The Chinese economy was agrarian*

By the nineteenth century, the

•population had increased enormously. 'The amount of land under culti
vation was not proportionately expanded and the government's policies
intensified the problems of the peasantry.

Estates were consolidated

3
at the expense of tenants and hired laborers," while the unequal burden
4
of taxation fell increasingly on the poor.
The government debased
copper coinage,"' Opium imports expanded rapidly; the drug was purchased
in silver,, causing a drain of the metal and an increase in its value.
The s3.lvex* shortage made it difficult for officials to collect the land
tax, and oroated hardship for the peasants who purchased silver with
debased copper,

As the covjrt sold political offices, corruption spread

among government officials, resulting in a decrease in the amount ox
revenue sent to the Imperial treasury.^
but not TO relieve the peasantry.

Court expenditures increased,

"The Chinese peasant was also the

victim of a series of natural calamities so devastating as to leave no
doubt- in the minds of the superstitious that the Heavenly mandate of
the Ch'ing dynasty had been completely exhausted."7
The government's oppressive economic and political policies led
"Lc social unrest.
militia,.

Banditry was rife, necessitating formation of local

In the heavily-taxed southern provinces of Kwangsi and Kwang-

tungs, the unassimilated HakJca. minority battled the Punt.i, or local
people., over unused land. In Kwangsi, disorder was so serious that the
8
Punti used militia against the Hakfcas,,
Military decentralisation
"made central military financing more and. more difficult,

As autarchy

3
spread, local resources became available only for local use; and so it
grew difficult to send official troops from one province to another,"9
Khile local revolts flourished and secret societies re-emerged, the
central government's policies became increasingly irrelevant to Chinese
society.
The presence of Europeans in China added, to the problems of the
Ch'iiig government.

In the nineteenth century, the Chinese found it

necessary to formulate a coherent policy that accomodated the European
"barbarians" who came to trade.

The Ch'ing dynasty adopted the tradi

tional Chinese method of managing barbarians.

As they assumed their

culture was superior, the Chinese thought that barbarians must follow
the emperor's irresistable moral suasion.

Through the rite of "tribute"

or gifts to the emperor, the Chinese established their superiority and
10
Initiated barbarians into their culture.

The tribute system func

tioned as a form of commerce and reinforced the government's prestige;
trade and tribute fused into a system of foreign relations.

"The

important thing to the rulers of China was the moral value of tribute.
The important thing for the barbarians was the material value of trade.
The. rub came when the foreign trade expanded, and finally . . . eclipsed
li
tribute entirely, without changing the official myth." x

As they

sought to bring- China into modernity to advance their trade interests,
I
Europeans rejected the Sinocentric world-view. The assertion of Western
trade principles, however, did not automatically lead to a change in
China's foreign policy.

Entrenched in their traditional attitudes, the

Chinese long resisted Westernization.
The Chinese initially limited trade to the "factories" at Canton.

As the illegal opium traffic expanded, arid the attendant disorder became
unmanageable9 the system collapsed.

"All the latent issues of diplo

matic equality, commercial freedom, bad delxt-s, legal jurisdiction, and
Sino-foreign friction generally, combined in the late 18.30's to poison
the once genial atmosphere of Canton and. create an explosive situation."'~

The "breakdown of the Canton system strongly affected Great

Britain, the most influential trading nation. In the Opium War (1PA0-1842), the Chinese and the British redressed mutual grievances.

De

feated,. the Ch'ing government settled on a policy of appeasement.

In

1842, the Treaty of Naming was signed., "by which the Chinese ceded Hong
Kong to the British and five treaty ports, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo,
Canton, and Shanghai were opened to trade. In 1843, the British Treaty
of the Bogue was signed, which contained clauses for the most-favorednation status (Article VIII) and extraterritorality (Article IX).
Through most-favored-nation status, the British, would receive any
privilege accorded to another treaty power, while extraterritorality
granted British officials jurisdiction over British subjects in China.
Throughout the nineteenth century, treaties facilitated expansion of
the China trade.

"Versed neither in economics nor in Western law, the

13
Manchu administration hardly realized what it gave away."
The Imperial government lost much of its prestige and authority
through the unequal treaties.

While Western law was forced upon it,

the treaty "provisions, by and large, were compromises.

British desire

14
had to be modified in the course of being realized."
The English
introduced Western law In China 'to promote regular commerce, but the
treaties did not resolve the problem of opium.

Although the British

5
sought to regularize the opium trade through legalisation, they were
thwarted by the emperor's ban on the drug and strong vested interests
in the contraband drug trade.

"The result was to split the foreign

trade of China into two parts, legal and illegal.

Two sets of foreign

communities, two channels for trade, two codes of conduct, grew up as a
15
consequence."
The coasting trade expanded, and along with it, piracy.
Illegal opium continued to balance the trade between Britain and China,,
The expected boom in English exported goods did not occur as China was
self--.sufficient.
expanded.

Chinese exports of tea and silk, however, rapidly

Shanghai and Amoy "became important commercial cities from

their proximity to the tea and. silk producing districts, eclipsing
Canton as a center of trade. Despite British intentions, commercial
expansion proceeded haphazardly.

"The real hinderances to trade were

not the statutory transit taxes but the officials who used them as an
excuse for their private exactions. The organized corruption of the
Chinese fiscal system applied to foreign imports as much as to the land
l6
tax or other aspects of Internal economy*"
Regularizatlon of trade
through treaties and the expansion of British economic interests was
impossible unless the Chinese responded to Western codes of conduct and
law.
At mid-nineteenth century, the British considered the doctrines
of Free Trade inviolable. Interference with the market was shunned,
except to protect trade and maintain free competition. In 1834, the
Hast India Company's monopoly in China ended, and through the treaties
that followed the Opium War, the British gradually established the
principles of Free Trade. "The Free Trade commercial treaty . , .

consisted ideally of only one clause—'the most-favoured-nation* clause.
The object of the Mercantilist Treaty was to create and sustain monopo
lies; the object of a Free Trade Treaty was to throw open world, trade
17
for the benefit of all."

Regardless of the lofty indifference the

Chinese displayed, toward commerce, Victorians considered opening China
to trade a boon to Chinese civilization and. the foreign trading nations.
Free Trade provided more than material benefits.

"The Fxee-trade

principle ..." Richard Cobden asserted, "shall act on the moral world
as the principle of gravitation in the universe,—drawing men together,
thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed., and language, and

18
uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace/'
Yet the foremost considerations of British officials were "the
national political interest and the fair and equal treatment of British
IP
trade and. finance overseas." ' Commercial treaties, rather than fo.eee,
were the usual means of extending British .interests in foreign nations.
An individual trader protected his own interests in fair competition
ensured by treaty. The British government generally adhered to a course
of non-intervention in the internal, affairs of foreign,nations or in
the interests of private individuals.

Government officials, however,

"accepted that wars for trading opportunities might constitute a justi
fiable use of public resources provided they were in the interest _pf
%
the nation as a whole . . . and that at least some notional diplomatic
justification based on abuse of treaty rights or international law
20
could, be put forward."

British officials sought to extend trade, not

authority, in foreign nations.
with great reluctance.

They adopted, a. course of intervention

?
The British hesitated to intervene in the affairs of China.
feared "another India."

They

To "begin by trading with China and to end by

governing 'was expensive,, problematic, and therefore undesirable.
"'Another India' would have "been superfluous; all thai could be achieved
on behalf of expansion of trade by some political dominion in the east
was in fact being achieved by India.
taking territory in China.

There was no strategic reason for

China was not on the route to anywhere.""'

The China market, though considered potentially fabulous by the "Old
China Hands," did not justify large-scale terrj.tor.ial control to secure
it.

China's size would have made it difficult for the British to exert

uniform control in the interior.

Great Britain's commercial and naval

supremacy made her confident of maintaining 'trade relationships.

"Her

leading position as a manufacturing nation and in the carrying trade,
and not least her system of financial credit, made Free Trade especially
convenient to her, and colonial markets and sources of supply, in the

22
„
formal sense, almost totally unnecessary."' Expansion of Free Trade,
rather than a desire for territorial aggrandizement or political control
guided British policy toward China.
By 1850, irregular!ti.es in the China trade again irritated the
British. Foreign Secretary Palmerston abandoned responsibility for
23
enforcing the tariff stipulated in' the treaty, • and adopted, a swag
gering attitude. "The time is fast coming when we shall be obliged to
strike another blow in China ..." he wrote.

"These half civilized

Governments . , . require a Dressing every eight or ten years to keep
them in order.

Their minds are too sl.1all.0w to receive an jjnpression

that will last longer than some such period and warning is of little

use,"'"4

Lord Palmerston left the Foreign Office in late 1851, however,

and his successors followed a more cautious policy.

In 1853» the

Taiping rebels' advance into the rich Yangtze valley added a new compli
cation to Sino-British relations;

the problem of British policy toward

the Taiping Rebellion.
In 183?{ Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, the future Taiping leader, experienced
visions during a mental illness that followed his third failure to pass
the Confucian-style civil service examination.

Hung came from a poor

family of Hakkas who resided near Canton. In his village, "he was
regarded as a future scholar-official certain to repay all those who
made /economic/ sacrifices to help him attain office."'

Upon recov

ering from his illness, Hung became the village school teacher, but in
1843, he again failed his government examination.,

In the same year he

read a religious tract, Good Words to Admonish the Age, and interpreted
his earlier visions in a Christian context.

Hung converted to Chris

tianity and began to preach his new faith. His reading cf the Christian
tracts was highly personalized.
call to himself in particular*

"Many passages he took to be a direct
Similarly, he believed that the Heavenly

Kingdom and God's chosen race were China and the Chinese, and he later
appropriated the former term for the name of his own revolutionary
state.
Hung converted his cousin, Hung Jen-kan, and a friend. Feng Yunshan.

Feng organized the God-worshipping Society on Thistle Mountian,

out of which grew the Taipings, Hung became an iconoclastic itinerant
preacher. In 1847, after an American missionary refused to baptize him,
ha joined the God-worshippers on Thistle Mountain, Hung encouraged

9
iconoclasm among the God-worshippers.

While the sect gained followers,

27
its actions enraged the local population.
several months "but returned in 1849.

Hung left the group for

He and Feng gathered leaders

among the God-worshippers, who later commanded the Taipings,

Adherents

of the God-worshipping Society mainly were from the poorer classes.
HaMca farmers, charcoal workers, smugglers- bandits, secret society
members, army deserters, convoy guards, and a number of followers from

78
aboriginal tribes joined the God-worshippers.~

The shift of trade to

Shanghai created an economic crisis around Canton; the resulting distress
and discontent induced many to join the God-worshipping Society.

Hunan

and- Xiangsi provinces, "full of unemployed boatmen and coolies; and the
Yangtze valley, with its impoverished peasants and 'propertyless vaga
bonds,"' were areas in which the God-worshippers attracted large
followings.
Membership of the God-worshipping Society rapidly increased as
Hakkas joined the sect for protection a,gainst the Punti. "In the
villages where they predominated, the Hakka congregations took over
local control and forced others to join.

The conflict between Hakka

and non-Hakka was thus transformed into one between the God Worshippers
Society and opposing militant organizations."

30

To fight the Punti who

organized militia and received government military assistance, the Godworshippers formed military camps, manufactured weapons, and established
a common treasury of goods.

31

"Two parties emerged:

one consisted of

the militia, gentry, and government; the other of the God-worshippers
and the oppressed Hakkas and outlaws."^

In late 1850, the chronic

battles between the Hakka and Punti in Kwangsi province grew to

10
unmanageable proportions, beginning the Taiping Rebellion, In 1851,
Hung Hsiu-ch'uan founded the T'ai-p'ing T*ien~kuo ("Heavenly Kingdom of
Great Peace") as a new dynasty of China.
Hie Taiping military government was consolidated under Hung Hsiuch'uan- the T'ien Wang or Heavenly King. Hung appointed five other
wangs or kingss

Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, the Eastern Zing and Taiping Prime

Ministerj Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, the Western King? Feng Yun-shan, the
Southern King; Wei Ch'ang-hui, the Northern King; and Shih Ta-k'ai, the
OO
Assistant King.
As second, in command, the Eastern King controlled the
other four kings,

By allowing their hair to grow long and refusing to

shave their foreheads, the Taipings defied Manchu tradition.
religious dogma to discipline their army.

They used

"The Ten Commandments, bap

tism. the keeping of the Sabbath were believed in, practiced, and
ruthlessly enforced. , . . The Biblical component was an effective
instrument of mass control and an important factor in Taiping military
success.

3*4

To rally the Chinese to their cause, the Taipings issued

declarations against the Manchus in which they frequently referred to
the Manchus' ethnicity.^

Early in the rebellion the Western and

Southern Kings were killed; however, the incompetence of the Manchu
forces and the rebels' strategy, ideology» organization, and discipline
36
enabled them successfully to march north; steadily gaining followers.
By 1853i the Taipings controlled several provinces and had established
Nanking as their capital city.
Western historians generally agree that the Taiping Rebellion
failed from its internal contradictions. The Taipings' Hakka origins,
their battles with the local Punti, the Chinese and the Hakkas'

resentment 'toward the alien Manchus all contributed to the tangled
ethnicity of the Taiping movement.

The Taipings practiced an unorthod

form of Christianity; their religion and iconoclasm offended Chinese
entrenched in Eastern beliefs, particularly the scholar-gentry Imbued
37
with Confucianism.*

Western observers were repelled, by the Taipings'

38
modification of Christianity,
which nevertheless contributed to the
39
movement' s politicissation.

Taiping Christianity was too Christian t

enable the rebels to attract leaders from the scholar-gentry, but
inadequately politicized for them to win enough followers among the
4o
ostensibly anti-Manchu Chinese. tfhile

the Taipings formulated a

system of communal goods in a "sacred treasury" and advocated land
redistribution upon communistic principles, their land reforms largely
remained unimplemented.

The Taipings gave precedence to warfare, and

the peasants were hostile to a revolutionary economi.c system that did
not satisfy their desire for private land ownership.

The rebels

lacked supporters among the scholar-gentry and much of the peasantry,,
yet they represented the most formidable challenge to Chinese civili
sation in the nineteenth century.
Neither the Chinese nor the Western trading nations passively
awaited the interne),! collapse of the Taiping Rebellion, which caused
havoc throughout most of China, disrupted trade, and threatened Wester
interests. The Imperial government's green-banner army was utterly
demoralised and corrupt.

The Imperial forces largely consisted of

local military units under gentry leaders such as Tseng Kuo-fan, who
defended the Confucian polity, and incidently the Manchu dynasty,
h?

against the Taipings.

The Imperial forces, however, received direct

military aid. and training from the British, as well as indirect
financial assistance from the Maritime Customs system under British
supervisiont
Historians continue to debate the cynicism of British intervention
in the rebellion.

They regard the war~indemniti.es owed by the Manchus
hj

to the British government,

the treaty provision for opening the

Yangtze River after the rebels' defeat,

and the Manchus' permissive

ness in the opium trade (as opposed to the Taipings* stance against the
\ 4r-;
drug)
as primary motives for British support of the Manchus.

While

the British had established diplomatic ties tc the Imperial government,
they followed a cautious, reluctant, and inconsistent course toward,
intervention.

British policy was neither rigidly pro-dynastic nor a

deliberate attempt to weaken the debilitated ImTjerial government.

His

torians vaunt and di.spara.ge the importance of foreign intervention in
^•6
the Taiping Rebellion,
but the internal failings of the movement
played a significant role in the rebels' defeat.
The Taipings* warfare, foreign policy, pseudo-Christian govern
ment, and trade policy demonstrated to the English that their interests
conflicted with the Free Trade interests of Great Britain.

The rebels*

policies and conduct, however, did not induce the British automatically
to support tho dynasty,

After the dissolution of the East India

Company's monopoly, British authorities continually experienced problems
with the Imperial government. Throughout the Taiping Rebellion they
exerted diplomatic pressure, and ultimately force, to exact the Manchus*
compliance with the Nanking Treaty.

While the British eventually

suj>ported the Imperial government, the Taiping Rebellion was not the

13
exclusive cause of the subsequent Sino-British alliance.

The Manchus'

adaptation to Western modes of diplomacy and trade principles signifi
cantly improved their relations with the British.

Sino-British.

cooperation gradually developed from events and diplomacy inf.lue.nced
largely, 'but not exclusively, by the Taiping Re"bel3.ion.
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CHAPTER I

REBELLION AND DIPLOMACY 1850-4855

Through rebellion in China, the British gradually became, involved
with upholding the Imperial government's sovereignty to protect their
commercial interests. Free Trade required political stability, which
the rebellions undermined.

Although the British avoided assuming

political authority in China, preservation of their economic interests
necessitated cooperation with the central government to further their
common interest, stability.

Problems of treaty implementation and.

revision, as well as the British policy of neutrality in the civil war
prevented corcplet<? Sino-British cooperation. In the early 1850*s a
tenuous Sino~British cooperation slowly developed from the circumstances
of rebellion.
At mid-century, rebellions flourished in China, threatening the
authority of the Manchu dynasty.

While the Small Sword Society, an

offshoot of the Triads, sought to re-establish the Ming dynasty, the
Red Turbans disturbed the area around Canton. The Taipings constituted
the greatest rebel force in China,

They eventually controlled, large

provincial areas and captured more than six hundred cities.

The various

rebel groups seldom cooperaxed; their divergent aims kept -them asunder.
While the government's decrepit green-banner army faltered against the
rebels, the local forces of the gentry were disunited until 1853* when
Tseng Kua-fan began to marshal them under his leadership,

17

Before 1853? the British ignored the rebellions developing in
China.

The Superintendent of Trade in China, Sir George Bonham, assured

Foreign Secretary Palmerston that "there has never been adequate ground
for investing their incursions with the title of insurrection.

No

person of respectability has joined them, and it is the habit of such
marauders ... to endeavour to lure the disaffected to their side by
1
the assumption of rank, display of badges and similar artifices."
Bonham foresaw, however, that the unsettling effect of rebellion around
Canton would depress British trade.

2

While the rebels remained a minor

threat to British interests, officials concentrated upon improving trade
relations with the Imperial government.
In the early 1850!sf the British were concerned with implementing
the Nanking and Bogue treaties.

Bonham complained that "a greater

degree of rigor has been exercised at the Ports for the purpose of
curtailing to the narrowest, limits the advantages gained by the
Treaty. , .

3

While Illegal opium traffic and piracy remained

problematic3 the treaty system verged on collapse as traders evaded
payment of tea and silk duties.

Disgusted with the corrupt Chinese

customs system, Palmerston abandoned efforts to combat smuggling, but
his reaction was temporary.

The British regarded legally-enforced

trade as axiomatic and continued diplomatic pressure to remove irregu
larities from the China trade. 'Hie Imperial administration obstinately
refused to Westernize its diplomatic Intercourse, which meant recognizing
"barbarian envoys as equals.

While the British considered direct

diplomatic relations with Peking a sine qua non to regular trade, the
Chinese studiously avoided this humiliation by dissembling and delay.

The "Canton city question" continued to irritate the British, as the
Cantonese refused to open the city to foreigners.

"Those responsible

for the conduct of English affairs in China set up, as an article of
faith, the dogma that the 'right of entry* was the keynote of success
in Chinese affairs.""' Mter Palmerston's unfulfilled threat of force,
Foreign Office policy became quiescent and official attention to the
treaties was diverted to the Chinese civil war.
In 1853» the success of the Taiping and Triad rebellions made the
English uneasy.

Although the British knew little of the rebels' move

ments and purposes, Bonham conjectured that the Manchus might request
assistance from the British naval forces to intimidate the Taipings at
Nanking.^

He requested "to be informed of the views of Her Majesty's

Government in regard to the whole of this question—and particularly to
•?

what extent, if assistance were given, it should be granted."'

Bonham

assured the Foreign Secretary that he would not render aid to the Manchu

8
unless the British obtained advantages in trade.' Intervention tempo
rarily appeared expedient.

Consul Alcock at Shanghai warned Bonham that

unless the Imperial government received foreign assistance, its downfall
o
was imminent.'

Bonham decided to confer with the rebels at Nanking.

His observations and decisions formed the basis of British policy toward
the Taiping .Rebellion.
While he obtained preliminary knowledge of the Taipings' religion,
government, and military strength, Bonham observed the political element
of their Christianity.
They have established a new religion, which may be called a kind of
spurious revelation. The base of this structure is supposed to be
founded upon the Old Testament and religious tracts; but they have
• superadded thereto a tissue of superstition and. ncnsense which makes

an unprejudiced party almost doubt whether it is not used merely as
a political engine of power by "the Chiefs to sway the^ginds of
those whom they are anxious to attach to their cause.'*"
Bonham was not wholly cynical about the rebels' faith, but emphasised
the political motives of the Taiping kings in using religious dogma to
control their forces.

He described the Taipings' puritanical discipline

"The whole army pray regularly before meals.

They punish rape, adul

tery, and opium smoking with death. . . . The women captured in battle
are lodged in separate buildings, as well as the children, who are at
the same tame clothed and educated."

Bonham explained the Taiping

hierarchy of kings and ministers, and estimated their force to be less

12
than 25,000 fighting men.

Upon meeting with the Taipings, Bonham

inaugurated the policy of British neutrality,.
Bonham cautioned the Taiping kings that interference with British
13
persons or property would invite retaliation. • To enforce neutrality,
he forbade British subjects to engage in the civil war.

His proclama

tion, however, was a tacit admission that some English had entered the
1^
war on an individual basis.
Problems of maintaining neutrality
multiplied as the rebellion continued.
Although neutral in the civil war, the British speculated about
trade relations with the Taipings, In June, 1853» the Taipings ad
dressed an open letter to the English in which they alluded to the
difficulties of trade.
"While we; on our parts, do not prohibit commercial intercourse, we
merely observe that . . « the going to and fro is accompanied with
inconvenience; and. , . . we would deem it better to wait^a few
months, until we have thoroughly destroyed the Tartars /the Manchus7
when, perhaps, the subjects of your honourable nation could go an#come without being involved in the tricks of these false Tartars.±
The-Taipings' overture met with Bonham's approval.

He observed to

21
Foreign Secretary Clarendon that "more Political and Commercial advan
tages are likely to he obtained from the Insurrectionists. , , .
Although the Taipings were inexperienced traders, Bonham considered them
more favorable to foreigners than the Imperialists, who were "proud,

, and inimical to an extension of Foreign Intercourse."17

overbearing

The central government's policies toward trs.de irritated the British,
but they abstained from aiding the Taipings to overthrow the Manchus as
a means of furthering their commercial interests.
The rebellion's adverse effect on trade at Shanghai negated the
Taipings' diplomatic gestures,
languid condition.

Bonham reported that "trade is in a

Imports of British goods at Sharghae /sic/ are

unsaleable, while at Canton they are forced off at some 20 or 30 per
cent lower rates than a few months back, . . . Prices /of tea/ at
present rule from 30 to 35 psr cent higher than they were last year,
-t g

while its quality is said to be inferior.11"1'

As the Chinese hoarded

Carolus dollars and British goods remained unsold, a currency shortage
developed, which necessitated large bullion imports.

The currency

problem was so great that even the opium traffic operated on a barter
system.1 9 As British merchants found it difficult to pay the duties on
their gocds, Consul Alcock withheld duties for a short time, violating
the Nankitig Treaty.
legal obligations.

Bonham, however, strictly interpreted British
He would, not permit merchants to defer payment of

20
duties without Chinese consent, which Alcock could not obtain.

Trade

with the Manchus involved considerable difficulty, yet the British were
committed to the Imperial government through the treaties.
In August, 1853) Bonham and the French representative in China,

H. de Bourboulon agreed upon a policy of cooperation.

In accordance

with Clarendon's policy, Bonham informed the French minister that the
British intended to maintain neutrality while negotiating for a Free
Trade treaty.

He assured BourboUlon that "Her Majesty's Government seek

no exclusive privileges for the British Trade in China, "but that what
ever' commercial advantages they may < . . obtain . . . they are , . .
anxious . . . to share with all the civilized nations of the
world. ..."

Extension of British Free Trade interests did not

entail British paramountcy.

The most-favored-nation clause ensured the

other treaty powers fair competition in the China market.

Although the

French minister slightly favored the Imperial cause, """ the British
reiterated their policy of neutrality and Free Trade.
The Triads' capture of Shanghai in September, 1853t worsened the
problems of trade and customs administration.

The Chinese customs

agent fled, the customhouse was destroyed, and government was in abey
ance.

To preserve a semblance of legal trade, Consul Alcock established

a provisional system of duty payment by collecting promissory notes.
With Foreign Office sanction, payment of "back duti.es would be enforced.
Clarendon informed Bonham that "if a Chinese government should be re
established at Shanghaif either by the rebels or by the imperial author
ities, the duty payments held by Alcock in promissory notes should be
paid over to it; otherwise, they should be given back to the mer™
?h

chants,""

In February, 185^f a Chinese customhouse was reestablished.

So:r:e merchants had escaped taxation under A'lcock's system; non-treaty
vessels were not subject to treaty regulation.

"In 'these circumstances

it was impossible to fulfill the conditions of equal duties upon all#
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demanded by the Board of Trade.The British government withheld its
decision on the payment of back duties until 18$4,
The Triads occupied Shanghai until February, 1855« assisted by
some British residents of the foreign settlement, who supplied arms to
the Imperialists and the .insurgents.
breach of English neutrality.

Clarendon admitted this was a

To enforce neutrality, he suggested that

British naval officers aid the Shanghai, consul in preventing "as far as
possible either of the Belligerent Parties from penetrating . . . the
26
precincts of the British settlement."

In April, iSj&t the cautious

Bonham was replaced "by Sir John Bowring, former secretary of Jeremy
?7
Bentham and an ardent Free Trader.

When the Chinese authorities at

Shanghai and Amoy requested British assistance against the rebels,
Bowring adhered to the policy of neutrality.

He insisted "that it is

not the purpose of our Government to interfere . . . unless the duty of
providing for the safety of British subjects or British property should
28
require interference."
Bowring Instructed Alcock to enforce neutral
ity rigidly and to punish those who supplied weapons either to the
29
rebels or the Imperialists.

The Shanghai settlors established an

"armed neutrality" and in the battle of Muddy Flat they drove the
Imperialists from the settlement. Foreigners, Bowring observed, "have
felt equally insecure from Imperialists and Insurgents—alike disorderly
and law!ess,"^
In July, Bowring mentioned the possibility of temporary inter
vention in the Shanghai crisis, fearing that "if the City is abandoned
to the Imperial Troops frightful slaughter will accompany their
entrance,'

31

Clarendon instructed Bowring net to interfere by .force,

3?
but approved, his attempts to mediate between the belligerents.
gave, a guarded endorsement of armed neutrality.

Ke

If protective measures

by the treaty powers and the Imperial forces failed, "it is competent
for the residents /of Shanghai/ to associate for purposes of self
defence:

as this however is an assumption of power independent of the

Chinese Gov/errimen/1, it would not be right that E/ei{J M/ajestv/'s
Superintendents or Consuls should be parties to such an association."

33

With French assistance, Consul Alcock constructed a barrier wall around
the foreign, settlement, "and by thus hindering foreign support of the
34
rebels facilitated the imperial siege."
The Senior Naval Officer at
Shanghai refused to assist in constructing and protecting the wall, as
naval forces were to protect only British persons and property,35
Clarendon concurred, and sharply reprimanded Bowring for this breach of
3o
neutrality.
from Shanghai.

With French support the Imperial forces drove the rebels
The British twice compromised their neutrality during

ths siege, despite the home government's injunctions against inter
ference.
Through the Triad occupations the English reorganised the Shanghai
customs system.

In exchange for payment of the back duties represented

by Alcock*s j>romissorry notes, the Imperial government sanctioned a
Foreign Inspectorate at Shanghai.
the notesf Clarendon disagreed.

Although Bowring favored payment of

"Under existing circumstances /at

Shanghai in 1853/ the Treaty arrangements with Chins, must be considered
as suspended, and . . . Alcock's measures should only . . . /have been/
enforced as long as it was reasonable to suppose that the suspension of
the Imperial Authority was of a temporary character. . . ,

37

The

prolonged interruption in government at Shanghai meant that the Chinese
lost their claim to the duties.
notes were never honored.

Clarendon reprimanded Bowring and the

This 'was perfidy, but the new customs col-

lectorate at Shanghai was far more efficient than the Chinese system,
and brought the Manchus badly-needed revenue to wage war against the
Taipings.

The Foreign Inspectorate was not a step toward British rule-

in China, nor was it a purposive bias in favor of the Imperial cause.
A local economic problem required a limited political solution.

"Free

trade and the most-favored-nation treatment, expressive of this com
mercial interest, were the raison d'etre of the Customs Service, whose
constant purpose was to provide equal terms of competition both among
individual traders and among the trading nations in China."

38

Sino-

British cooperation was part of the Sino-barbarian dyarchioal tradi
ng
tion."*^
While the Triads occupied Shanghai, the simultaneous advance of
the Taijiing forces caused the British additional consternation.
Established at Nanking, the Taipings embarked upon a two year northern
expedition to attack Peking.

They foolishly besieged Huai-ch'ing

instead, of directly advancing to Peking, enabling the Imperial
40
government to summon aid from the provinces.

Despite some brave

fighting against the Imperialists, the rebels were poorly prepared for
the expedition, and suffered a humiliating defeat.

The Taipings,

however, tied up the government forces in North China and shielded thei:
41
capital city from assault.

In western China, Tseng Kuo-fan's Hunan

Army was less successful against the rebels, although Tseng began a
forceful propaganda war to attack Taiping ideology and reassert

2.6

Confucianism.
successes.

Under Shih Ta-Ic'ai, the Taipings reversed Tseng's early

"As a good administrator and military commander, Shih

received popular support, whereas the Ch'ing government troops were
given a cool reception. . . .
4?
a success, •' ~

By j.856 the Taiping western campaign was

Although the Taipings' rriil.ita.ry strategy was flawed and

their success uneven, they continued their course of destruction.
Bearing quickly formed an unfavorable opinion of the Taipings'
ability to govern, should their march on Peking succeed.

He observed

that
one sees a disorganising and destroying influence which is every
where undermining authority but which seems to furnish few
materials for the establishment of order and good government. Even
if the Nanking party should obtain the mastery at Peking; there is
great reason to apprehend that a very large portion of the vast
empire would not recognize nor obey its authority, and that it,
would not be competent to subdue
elements of sedition and
disorder so universally scattered. •*
's

Like Bonham, Bowring remarked that no "person of rank,, eminence, or
influence" had joined the rebels, whose low origins made him doubt
their quality of leadership.

i|i|

He condemned the political tactics of

Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, who "introduced enough of mystery to awe and interest
an ignorant multitude,—enough of fanaticism to rouse their indif
ference,---and enough of despotism to control and subdue a people
2x 5
predisposed to obedicr.ce and servility. . , ."

Bowring considered

the Taipings x»oorly qualified to provide mature, rational government in
China.
The Americans and the British sent separate observers to Nanking
to meet with the rebels.

American Commissioner McLans described the

bizarre aspects of Taiping Christianity.

The Americans "were told that

. •• . /Hung Hsiu-ch'uan/ had a mission direct from Cod, and from his

?J{
elder brother Jesus Christ to assume the sovereignty of the earth—that
all who recognized his divine authority were to be his subjects and his
brethren, and were to present to him tributes in the shape of 'precious
46
rifts'. ..."

The- Taipings "distinctly repelled" any suggestion that

they receive religious instruction from missionaries, and insisted that
foreigners acknowledge Hung's authority.

"Except as 'brothers' or

'subjects' or 'tribute bearers* to the Celestial Kings it appeared that
the visits e:f foreigners would receive no encouragement, but would on
4'^
the contrary be most unwelcome.' '

"Brethren" of the Heavenly King
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were welcome to trade provided they submitted to Hung's authority,
Eemini.sce.nt of the Manchns' attitudes toward foreigners, the Taipings'
arrogance was unconducive to cordial diplomatic relations with the
British.
Although the English observers Lewin Bowring and W. H. Medhurst
added new condemnations of the Taipings to those of Bowring and McLane,
they praised the rebels' .military spirit, which contrasted with "the
49
inertness and imbecility of the Imperial soldiers."

Bowring and

Medhurst questioned whether Hung Hsiu-ch'usn existed. —.The Taipings
consistently spoke of "the pleasure of the Eastern Xing, his power, his
i:q
m a j e s t y , ano his influence.The English anticipated the growth cf
Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's authority, which later caused severe dissension,,among
%

the Taipings, Despite Bonham's optimistic assessment, Bowring and
Medhurst doubted that orderly trade relations with the Taipings could
be instituted.

The rebels' "position is not that of a consolidated

power, anxious to foster commerce and bent upon the development of its
resources, but simply that of a military organisation at war with the

existing Government. . . .

Trade , « . is utterly non-existent, . . ."

To illustrate the Taipings' anti-trade policy, Bowring and Medhurst
mentioned that the rebels prohibited foreign, vessels access to coal
deposi ts that ,fa.c5 liteted navigation of the Yangtze River.^' This
policy antagonized, the British who wished to open the river trade.

The

Taipings* arrogant leaders, unstable government, and their impairment
of British trade hardened officials' attitudes against them, and com
pelled. the British to reassess their relationship with the Imperial
government.
The British deprecated the Manchu administration for its military
incompetence against the rebels, but resigned themselves reluctantly to
continue diplomatic relations with the government. Although the Tai
pings "encountered a resistance from the Tartars, and a want of support
from the native populations in the Northern Provinces," Alcock reported
. the Imperial Government is as incapable of profiting . . . by
causes of discouragement to the Insurgents, as these are of seizing the
Seat of Government.After reviewing the failures of the Taipings
and. the Imperialists, Alcock predicted an extended civil war.

Bowrin

found it difficult to maintain cordial relations with the Marchus. He
complained to Foreign Under-secretary Hammond that "it is hard, to get
on with these stubborn Mandarins-—and though stiff they are as subtle a
otters.""In the same letter, he intimated using force to exact the
Manshus' cooperation.

Upon receiving accounts of the Taipings at

Nanking, however, Bowring conceded that the Manchu administration was
more conducive to British interests than the rebel government,

"There

is no great element at work in this disorganizing revolution which will

not be less favorable to the extension of commercial and political
relations with foreigners than is the existing Imperial Government,
bad. corrupt, proud, and ignorant though it be.""'

Clarendon agreed

w
that the Manchus favored foreign interests more than the rebels," but
shared Bowring'b distrust of the Imperialists,
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Through the most-favored-nation clause, 185^ was the year for
revision of the Nanking Treaty.

Bowring considered opening Canton and

establishing personal diplomatic relations with Chinese authorities the
most important issues, but Commissioner Yeh refused to negotiate with
him on terms of diplomatic equality.
several treaty revisions;

The British government demanded

access to the interior of China or free

navigation on the Yangtze River, legalization of the opium trade,
elimination of inland transit duties, piracy suppression, establishment
of satisfactory diplomatic relations with Peking and direct access to
Imperial viceroys, as well as an interpretation of the treaties accord59
ing to the foreign text.

When Yeh asserted that he had neither the

power nor desire to revise the treaties, the British, French, and
American envoys proceeded north to Peking.

After some delay, low-

ranking officials met with the diplomats, and announced that they pos
sessed no power to negotiate.

They insisted that the British had no

right to demand, treaty revision by virtue cf clauscs in the American
treaty,^ denying the British most-favored-nation status.

"There seemed

no hope of any successful result from negotiations conducted under such
conditions, and the envoys returned, south, convinced , . . that no
revision of the treaties could be obtained, unless supported and
6i
enforced by a demonstration of armed force."

By dissembling, the

Chinese forestalled negotiations, "but their tactics exasperated the
British,
In December, 135^, Commissioner Yeh applied to the British for
assistance against the Red Turban rebels.

British Consul Robertson

optimistically reported that the traditional enmity toward foreigners
displayed by Canton merchants had changed to pro-foreignism.

Cantonese

spoke "openly and unreservedly of the weakness of their Government
. . . and their desire to see life and property guaranteed at the
expense even of foreign intervention. ..."

With Clarendon's

approval}' Bowring reiterated the Liberal policy of non-intervention;
64
the British refused to protect any interests but their own.
Like
Bonham, Bowring forbade any British subject to enter the civil war or
f ro
S
to provide material aid to either the rebels or the Imperialists.
He

instructed Robertson to warn the rebels that "if by any acts of theirs,
British Interests are sacrificed, we shall be compelled to visit such

66

misdeeds with . . . punishment."

Early in 1355> the Red Turbans

attempted to blockade Canton, further antagonizing the British.

Bowring

warned the rebel chiefs that "any claim to the right of blockade will
not be admitted, nor will they be allowed to bring their war into
places peacefully occupied by Foreigners under Treaty guarantees, to
interrupt lawful Trade, or to molest the persons or property of British
Residents or Traders," ( The British indirectly aided Yell's expulsion
of the rebels by the intimidating presence of British naval power at
Canton;this constituted another bias in favor of the 'Imperialists,
Yet the British considered it essential to protect their trade rights
guaranteed by the Nanking Treaty,

Although Commissioner Yeh ordered as
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many as 70,000 persons beheaded to purge the Red Turbans from the
neighborhood of Canton, the trade situation remained unsettled.
Rebellion continued to disrupt trade, undermining the legal
guarantees of.regular commerce. In June., 1855s Interpreter Sinclair
reported that the Taipings threatened Kang-chou. Hs feared that if
they took the city, the rebels would upset the tea market by blocking
70
the trade route to Shanghai,

At Canton, restoration of trade remained.

7i
problematic as bands of robbers interfered with the transit- of goods.
Piracy at Whampoa considerably strained Sino-British relations.

Consul

Robertson berated Commissioner Yeh for permitting piracy, which
compelled the British to maintain a large naval force in the Whampoa
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area to protect their subjects.
The English resented disregard, of
their right to Free Trade,

Reluctant to miss a new commercial opportu

nity, Clarendon Informed Bowring that "if Whampoa becomes a place of
trade from events with wh/ich/ K/er7 M/ajesty's/ Gov/ernmen/t or
Brit/ish/ subjects are not connected, /there was/ no objection to
engage in de facto legitimate Trade."73

While they wished to ensure

the legality of trade, the English were reJ.uctant to sacrifice their
interests and were not adverse to adopting pragmatic solutions to
problems of trade.
After the establishment of tne Foreign Inspectorate at Shanghai,
the British experienced new difficulties with customs regulation; which
necessitated diplomacy with the Manchus.

The government proposed an

interior transit tax on tea which the British considered injurious to
the expanding trade at Foochow.

Bowring instructed Medhurst to ''show

that the export duties fairly and equally levied wall be far more

productive to the Imperial revenues. . . . Take this very appropriate
opportunity of offering your cooperation for the establishment of a
system of Inspectorship and control, such as exists at Shanghae. . .
Clarendon strongly desired that the Manchus extend the Shanghai customs
system to other ports as British merchants protested against irregular
ity in customs collection.

He sought to end. these complaints while

tempering the Manchus' ant.i-foreignism.

"When the Chinese Government

finds its revenues increased, as they will be largely, by the strict
enforcement of legal duties, it will become more reconciled not only to
foreign trade but to the foreigners engaged in it. . . ."7^
" Clarendon'
policy was calculated, to serve British economic interests; it was not
an attempt to gain political authority in China.

His policy was a

response to a local economic problem that gradually assumed political
importance in Sino-British relations.
Throughout 1855» Bowring sent unfavorable reports of the Taipings
to the Foreign Office. He informed Clarendon that the rebels' Christ!™
aaity received little attention,

and that Taiping influence contracte

after the failure of the Peking expedition.

Although the rebel cause

weakened in the north and several maritime provinces, "throughout the
rest of China . . . there is more or less insurrection or disorder of a
nrj

kindred character." '

The British attributed the continuation of the

Taiping movement to the weakness of the government forces and the rebel
ry O

tendency to abandon cities after exhausting their resources.

The

Taipings, Bowring concluded, "appear to be losing all popular sympathy,
and generally /seem/ to be regarded as marauders.As the Taipings
failed to settle In the provinces and establish a stable government,

their cause continued to fall in British estimation.
At the close of 1855, Bowring's disgust with the rebel movement
superseded Bonham's tacit favor of the Taipings, but British attitudes
toward the Manchus altered less markedly«

The rebels' initial trade

policy represented a novel acceptance of foreign relations which the
Manchus significantly lacked. Their subsequent trade policy and their
seeming Inability to govern deflected British attention to the Imperial
administration.

Although Sino-British relations seldom were cordial,

they improved through the establishment of the Foreign Inspectorate,
As a result, the English were drawn into further diplomatic negotiations
with the Manchus,

While the rebellion disrupted established trade

routes and impaired the transit of English imported goods, it stimulated
exports of tea ana. silk, which the Chinese could not afford to buy as
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a result of the havoc in China's interior. ' The British developed new
tra.de Interests during the early phase of the rebellion,., which they
strongly desired to expand.

This necessitated diplomacy with the Manchu

to regtilarl.se the trade and. customs system.

Yet the Imperial govern

ment resisted diplomatic pressure for treaty revisions and from the
British perspective, it represented only a slight improvement over the
Taipings.
Despite the home government's injunctions against interference,
British neutrality in the rebellion was flawed.

Breaches in neutrality

committed by British subjects supplying arms to the rebels and joining
their ranks did not constitute the official response to the rebellion;
nevertheless, these activities undermined British policy and embarrassed
the British government. Delay in commuRicat5.cn between England and

China caused a lapse between Foreign Office policy and the actions of
British officials in China, which led to Inconsistencies in the British
response to the rebellion.

The- primary concern of the British was to

secure the safety of trade, not to render support to the Imperial,
government.

While protecting their trade interests against the rebels,

the British provided coincidental, indirect assistance to the Manchu
authorities, which created a tenuous Sino-British alliance.

In 185-6,

the Second China War destroyed the precarious relationship between the
British and Manchu governments.
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CHAPTER II

TREATY REVISION AND THE TAIPING CRISIS 1856-1859

A temporary waning of the Taiping Rebellion coincided with the
worsening of Sino-Britlsh relations over the issues of entry into Canton
and treaty revision.

While British policy toward the rebels became

increasingly biased in the Manchus' favor, the Taipings failed to
sustain their threat to Western interests and the Imperial government.
The hiatus in the Taiping movement indirectly hastened the ultimate
clash between the Chinese and English governments.

Relieved from the

strain of rebellion, the Imperial authorities directed their energies
toward repelling the Europeans1 persistent efforts to revise the Nanking
Treaty.

The Western powers, unhampered by rebel threats to their

interests, were free to focus their attention upon exacting new treaties
from the Manchus.
Throughout 1856, the British consuls (with the exception of T. T.
Meadows), and. Sir John Bowring continually deprecated the Taiping move
ment. The rebels' Christianity worsened British opinion of them.
Consul Robertson commented upon the imperiousnoss of the Taipings, who
adopted "the name of a liberal religion without yielding one step of the
exclusiveness they have been educated .in. . . . The Dynasty , , , may
be superseded by that of Taeping /'sic7> but the policy will be the
same. . . ,"

The rebels' arrogance closely resembled that of the

Manchusf and correspondingly diminished British sympathy for them.

4o
Robertson considered Taiping Christianity hopelessly decadent.

"There

is no Civilization in it beyond the assumption of Holy names, which are
desecrated for the material purpose of forming a new Dynasty . . , it
O
is a watchword and nothing more."'" While disgusted with the rebels *
use of Christian doctrine to advance their cause, the British were more
concerned by the Taipings' inability to govern.
Although the Taiping movement revived, Bowring reported, it merely
disorganized Chinese society.*' He considered the rebels' lack of an
effective system of government a serious deficiency. .Bowring, however,
coupled his denunciation of the Taiping' movement with an equally un
favorable report of the Imperial administration.

"I find nowhere any

growing confidence in or affection for the Imperial Government," Bowring
wrote.

"It is utterly unable to grapple with the difficulties of its

position. . . . These revolutionary bands snake all confidence in The
Peking Government, whose blindness, pride and obstinancy seem impervious
Ij.
to ail .lessons of experience."

Neither the rebels nor t,he Imperialists

held a strong political ascendancy in China, and the civil war reached
a stalemate, which briefly permitted the English to regain their position
as neutral observers.
In May, 3.856, the Taipings routed the Imperialists at Chinkiang
and. threatened Shanghai.
dismayed the British.

The prospect of another occupation and siege

After ejection of the Triads at Shanghai, British

commercial interests had expanded, and. British officials strongly
reacted against a new threat to trade.

Consul Robert,son suggested chat

the policy of neutrality was obsolete.

"Times and circumstances may

occur when that policy can be carried a little too far . . , and our

tacit declaration of non-intervention be construed into weakness. . . ."
He proposed that the British use their naval forces to intimidate the
rebels, and that the city of Shanghai be placed under a joint protector
ate of the tres.ty powers to avert attack.^

Bowring remained complacent

about the safety of British subjects, but feared the stagnation of
trade.

He offered "to concur in any arrangement by which all parties

would be interdicted from making the Five Ports the seat of hostilities"
and favored Robertson's recommendations.7

Clarendon agreed that British

interests could not be sacrificed in the civil war.

Pie instructed

Bowring tc cooperate with the Americans to defend their common interests
at Shanghai.

Bowring was to inform the rebels that "any attack upon

the City of Shanghai which is full of British Subjects and property will
be repelled by force of arms? but that the British Government will in
no way interfere in the Civil, war if the Ports in which British commerce
is carried on and to which British Subjects are committed are respected
by the insurrectionary forces."

8

Clarendon did not consider his policy on the defense of Shanghai
a breach in neutrality.

"It would be unjustifiable to allow the great

amount of British Property at Shanghai to be exposed to plunder. . . .
It a,ppears to Her Majesty's Gov/ernmen/t- that a bona fide observance of
neutrality . . . does not require . . . such a sacrifice of British
Interests."9

The American representative, Dr, Parker, hinted at joint

Anglo-American assistance to the Manchus.

Bowring rejected any sug

gestion that the British compromise their neutrality.

He informed

Parker that "if the Imperial Government should make the armed inter
vention of Great Britain in its favori the condition of concessions

42
political or commercial I . . , advise your Ecxellency that I am not
10
authorized to promise such intervention. . . . "

11

Bowring's response to the American.

C l a r e n d o n approved.

Although the British continued

to avoid direct assistance to the government, they compromised their
neutrality in favor of the Manchus by extending their protection to all
the treaty ports.

They had expanded their scope of interest to include

the port cities rather than the foreign settlements alone.

As a result

of this alteration in British policy, a greater amount of incidental
aid. to the Manchus was inevitable, but the British regarded themselves
as neutral in the civil war.
In the latter months of I8j6, internecine strife ruined the Tai
pings' organization and leadership.

The Eastern King's steadily-growing

power and arrogance led the jealous Hung Hsiu-ch'uan to order his exe
cution.

The Northern King and his followers murdered the Eastern King

12.
and twenty thousand of his adherents.
The Northern King's ambition
grew in turn, and he attempted to assassinate the Assistant King Shih
Ta-k'ai, In November, the Northern King was decapitated.
leadership disintegrated.

Taiping

"Only Shih Ta-k'ai, the Assistant King,

remained to share power with the Heavenly King, 'who withdrew more and
more from the real world and left near relatives to speak in his
name.

13

Bereft of capable leaders, the rebel cause faltered.
%

While they knew of the Taiping purges, the British doubted that
strife among the rebels would end rebellion in China.

After the death

of the Eastern King, Bowring observed that "on the whole, the reports
are- more favorable to the Imperialists," but he saw "no present prospect
14
. « . of anything like the restoration of tranquility."
Chinese

Secretary Waie predicted the collapse of the Taiping movement from its
15
internal dissent.
Like Bowring, he did not foresee restoration of
peace from dissolution of the Taipings,

"An, attractive precedent of

the facilities and privileges of sedition has "been established, and
. . . the multitude who have tasted the sweets of a change . . . will
16
be slow to accept again the inglorious condition of the working man."
Proliferation of rebel groups led the British to anticipate a prolonged
civil war in China.
The crisis in the Taiping movement continued through I858, pro
viding the Chinese and British authorities some respite from the
problems of rebellion.

The Taipings refused to establish diplomatic

relations with foreigners,1? removing potential distractions to SinoBritish negotiations.

The British increasingly discounted a rebellion

that failed to defeat the. incompetent government forces.

Bowring

forwarded several reports on the disorganization rampant among the

18
Imperial armies.

"The weakness and corruption of the Mandarins," he

observed, "serve to counterpoise the progress of the Insurrectionists.
What appears most to menace the rebel cause is the dissensions and
19
defections among Its principal leaders at Nanking. ..."
He pin
pointed the Taipings' greatest weakness:

inadequate leadership.

While Shih Ta.-k'ai remained at Nanking until May, 185?, he.jfgiled
*

20

to assume administrative authority.
an independent campaign.

He left the Taipings and formed

"With him went some of the best military

commanders, and his departure was thus another grave setback to the
Taiping movement.Although the Heavenly King appointed a number of
new officials to the Taiping hierarchy, none were as capable as the

Eastern or Assistant Kings.

The Taipings floundered in battle.

While

they retained forces in the cities along the banks of the Yangtze, they
lost control, of the river to Tseng Euo-fan's army.

Supplies for the

Taiping array became difficult to obtain without the navigation of the

22
Yangtze, further weakening the rebel cause.
on the defensive.

"The Taipings were thus

Their military moves were worked out in conferences

by the commanders of the main Taiping units themselves without regard
to the government of the Heavenly King. . . . These commanders thought
in military terms and were no longer truly concerned with . . . the
23
revolutionary purpose of the Taipings."

The rebels lost the central

organization necessary for concerted warfare.

They won intermittent

victories against the government, but they lacked their previous unity
and Ideological fervor. The movement steadily deteriorated.

Disorga

nisation of the Taipings made English neutrality easier to Implement,
and enabled the British to concentrate upon improving their trade and.
diplomatic relations with the Imperial government.
The recession of the Taiping Rebellion led to a revival In trade.
24
The import trade expanded, and exports reached new heights.
Consul
Robertson reported that "the shipments of Tea and silk will be this year
as large as in any former season. ... As long as the Imperialists
and Rebels confine their operations to the Yangtze Kiang and leave the
tea and silk producing districts . . . free from their ravages, they
may go on fighting until one or the other is worn out."
26
tine weapons trade continued.

25 The elandes-

Importation of weapons at Shanghai was

?7
forbidden'" until Clarendon informed Bowring that he possessed no legal
28
power to halt the trade,

The weapons trade was only one source of

^5
profit derived from the rebellion. The rebels blocked certain transit
routes to Shanghai, diverting a large proportion of the tea trade to
Foochon.

As a result of the Taiping Rebellion, the treaty port system

began its long-awaited development.

The currency situation remained

problematic, and the British continued imports of 'bullion to pay for
tea and silk.

The currency system remained chaotic until 1857, when the

29
Shanghai tael became the universal coin of exchange.
expanded in 1856, it remained irregular.

Although trade

Dissatisfied with Sino-

British commerce, the Foreign Secretary contemplated new efforts to
renegotiate the treaties.
As the American and French governments had specified I856 as the
year for revision of their treaties, the British had allies in their
attempt to improve the trade system.

Clarendon suggested sending a

legation of American, French, and British representatives to Peking,
noting that "the negotiations for this purpose are more likely to be
successful if supported by the presence of a considerable naval force.'

30

The American government instructed Dr. Parker to negotiate for residence
01 foreign diplomats at Peking, unlimited trade in China, freedom of
religion in China, and reform of the Chinese courts.
red only on the need for residence of envoys at Peking.

Bowring concur
He favored the

limited objective of opening the Yangtze River to trade, and considered
4

the other points of Parker's instructions chimerical..32
French and British diplomatic support.

Parker received

He departed for the Peiho in

July, but Chinese authorities delayed him at Shanghai with promises of
negotiation.

"Conference succeeded conference, talk was drowned in

talk, and the skilled Chinese diplomats kept . . . /Parker/ in leash

46
f r o m clay to day; until it became too late to go to the Peiho."

33 Diplo

matic relations remained unsatisfactory! the American mission had
aecomplished nothing.
The Canton city question and violation of their treaty rights
through piracy led the English into war with the Imperial government.
In 18.56, anti-foreignism at Canton re-emerged.
foreigners with death for entering the city,

34

Cantonese threatened
denying to the British

what they considered a fundamental right. The Imperial government
insisted that foreign diplomats confer with Commissioner Yeh to discuss
treaty revision.

Yeh annoyed the foreign representatives by refusing

3C>
diplomatic' intercourse,""

The mutual hostility between feh and the

foreign representatives intensified over the Issue of piracy.

Rapid

development of piracy around Canton and Hong Kong, along with constant
attacks upon Kowloon necessitated British ordinances which granted
Chinese-owned vessels colonial registration, permission to fly the
36
British flag, and the right to British protection.

The Imperial

government's chronic inability to suppress piracy forced the British
to assurae the unwanted responsibility of police power in the China Sea.
To protect their interests, the British had resorted to an expedient
which soon created new problems of jurisdiction.
In late 1855» the Chinese seized two lorchas flying the British
flag, on charges of salt smuggling.

At Bowring's request, British

37
naval authorities intervened, and Clarendon approved his decision.
By 1856, Clarendon was exasperated with the Imperial government.

"It

is hopeless to expect co-operation from the Chinese authorities,11 he
wrote, "and it appears impossible to create any mixed Tribunals for the

47
trial of pirates. . . .

Those Authorities though they will not ask for

the assistance of H/er/ M/ajesty/'s Ships of War are content that it
38
should "be afforded. . ..The Imperial government's inadequate
measures against piracy, its intransigence over treaty revision, and
the anti-foreignism inherent in its policies increasingly aggravated
the British.

The Arrow incident exhausted British patience with the

Manehu government.
On 8 October 1856, Commissioner Yeh ord.ered the lorcna Arrow to
be seized.

A Hong Kong merchant owned the vessel, which was mastered

by a British subject,

"An act of aggression on an individual ship thus

granted British papers could be considered only as a means of adminisiering a slap to the responsible British authorities..

39

Yeh claimed

that the lorcha was owned by another Chinese merchant, that a notorious
pirate was aboard the vessel, and that contrary to English assertions,
4o
the British flag was not flying at the time of seizure.
know that the vessel's sailing license had expired.

He did not

He arrested the

crew without the British consul's warrant, and "a British ship in
Chinese waters is British soil, and all on board, persons or property,
41
are under British protection."
extraterritorality.

English jurisdiction applied through

Consul Parkes requested Yeh to apologize, release

the twelve-man crew, and in future to respect the British flag.

Yeh

insisted upon detaining three of the crew for examination, and berated
the English for their colonial registration of Chinese vessels, which
42
created, confusion.
Clarendon regarded expiration of the vessel's
license "a matter of British regulation" and thought Parkes's demands
43
"very moderate under the circumstances," " Yeh's actions outraged

Clarendon, who approved retaliation to obtain redress of British
44
grievances.

With the Crimean War over and. the India Mutiny yet to

begin, the British adopted a belligerent policy toward China.
The problem, at Canton remained local for several months after the
Arrow seizure.

After Yeh refused to meet Parkes's demands, the English

seized an Imperial war-junk.

Yeh finally released the twelve prisoners,

but upon conditions that Parkes found unacceptable.

"Mr. Parkes there

fore refused to receive them, and, as there had been no apology
l\ K

offered, the question passed into the hands of the naval authorities."
British Admiral Seymour rapidly seized several forts around Canton and
destroyed a fleet of war-junks.

For three months the British sporadi

cally shelled Canton, but Yeh refused to submit.

Redress for the Arrow

incident constituted only part of the motives behind the Sino-British
conflict, "The fundamental cause of the ensuing war was the desire of
the Western Powers to perfect the work inaugurated as they imagined in
46
the treaties of the forties."
At the end of 1856, the rupture between the British and Chinese
governments remained minor.

Clarendon continued to instruct Bowring

upon diplomacy for obtaining regular duties collection, as the British
government would ''admit no obligation to supply the vigilance which the
4?
Chinese Authorities ought themselves to exercise."
Clarendon-regarded
*
the Chinese prejudice against the system as a formidable barrier to its
extension, and authorized Bowring to end the Shanghai system if a
48
general Foreign Inspectorate could not be established.

The earlier

work toward regularizing the customs system was useless without Chinese
cooperation.

While the British preferred diplomacy to war with the

49
Manchus, they were impatient fox- substantial treaty revision rather than
local reforms.

The Arrow war provided, the final justification to

redress diplomatic grievances.
Determined to exact a new treaty from the Manchus, the British
government appointed the Earl of Elgin High Commissioner and Pleni
potentiary to China.

Elgin was instructed to demand redress and.

compensation for losses and injuries sustained "by British subjects,
residence for the British envoy at Peking, and direct written coiamu49
nication with Chinese officials.

Clarendon enjoined Elgin

to induce the Chinese Government to consent to throw open the ports
of China generally to foreign commerce, and to allow the subjects
of foreign Powers freely to communicate with the great cities in the
interior, but more especially with those which are situated, on the
large rivers and those lying immediately within the sea-board of
the north-eastern coast. . » . It would be desirable that your
Excellency should include the important city of Nankin /sic/ by
name, as one of the places to which British merchants should, have
access? but as that city is now in the hands of the insurgents, it
might be best to obtain in general terms permission to frequent ^ge
Yang-tze-keang river, and to trade with the cities on its banks.v
The British sought to expand and to regularize the China trade.

Elgin

was to negotiate upon tra.de duties, internal taxation, and legalisation
of the opium trade.

The British claimed no exclusive advantages for

their trade; Elgin cooperated with the French and the Americans.

51

Begardless of the court's hostility to foreign trade and its opposition
to treaty revision, the British persistently asserted their Free Trade
interests.
In June, the Chinese and the British agreed to localize the
hostilities at Canton, a policy that the home government approved.

<2

The India Mutiny delayed settlement of the Chine, problem, as troops
bound for China were diverted to India..

Bereft of military support for

his journey to the Peiho, Elgin waited.

Clarendon had mentioned an

attack upon Canton as an unfavorable alternative to a demonstration of
force at Peking.

Elgin decided that "he must follow his instructions

and make at least an attempt to induce the Peking government to settle
outstanding questions by . . . diplomacy, but that, in the case of a
53
diplomatic repulse, he must be prepared to strike promptly at Canton."
In August, the English blockaded Canton.

Delajrs in coordinating

meetings and resolutions among the foreign envoys, -and lack of suffi
cient military force destroyed the opportunity for the journey to
Peking.

The British settled upon the limited objective of subduing

Canton.

Although the blockade induced considerable distress at Canton

by halting trade, the English observed that the Cantonese made no
preparations for war.

54

In December, Admiral Seymour completed the

blockade with newly-arrived supplementary forces.

The envoys informed

Commissioner Yeh that if he yielded to the British right of entry, and
provided compensation for British losses at Canton, the city would be
55
spared."

Yeh refused.

In reply the English and French bombarded

Canton, seizing it on 29 December 185?.
While the Cantonese passively resisted the allied occupation, in
56
February, Elgin thought it safe to suspend hostilities against China."
Yeh was arrested and exiled to Calcutta, where he died.

"Canton being

thus disarmed and held, the ambassadors were free to turn their atten
tion to the principal object of their mission, negotiating with the
57
court of Peking, and securing a revision of the treaties."

Elgin

requested the Imperial government to send an accredited plenipotentiary
to Shanghai by the end of March.

58

The Manchus failed to respond. In

t^A

his determinantion to break the impasse between the British and Chinese
over treaty revision, Elgin was prepared to use force.

He requested

Admiral Seynour to ensure that a fleet of gunboats would be available
50

at Poking.

Elgin departed for the Peiho.

At Tientsin, the English,

French, Russian, and American envoys launched a diplomatic onslaught
against the Manchus.
On 20 April, the foreign envoys assembled at Taku,

Elgin re

quested to confer with a Chinese representative empowered to revise the
treaties.

On 10 May, the Chinese envoy announced that his government

refused to enlarge his powers of negotiation..Elgin had warned the
6i
Chinese that such a delay would invite hostilities.

He accordingly

directed Admiral Seymour "to summon the Commander of the /Taku/ forts
to deliver them temporarily into your hands, on the assurance that you
will return them when the negotiations in which the Plenipotentiaries
are engaged shall have been brought to a satisfactory issue, and If the
summons ... be disregarded, to take them by force." "

As the Chinese

refused the English demand, Seymour captured the forts.

The envoys

proceeded inland to Tientsin and the Chinese acceded to their request
for accredited negotiators.

"The appointment of these high officials

was evidence that, at last, the court of Peking realised the seriousness
of the situation, and was resolved to free itself, by negotiation, from
the pressure of an armed occupation of the portal of the capital."
To open negotiations, the Chinese met with the foreign envoys sepa
rately.

While Elgin's brothers Lord Frederick Bruce, nominally headed

the English negotiators, the Interpreters Mr. Wade and Mr. Lay performed
the work of revision.

Helpless under the determined browbeating of Mr,.

52
Lay, the Chinese acquiesced, to British demands.
The Chinese consented to the toleration of Christianity, measures
to suppress piracy, revision of tariffs and customs duties, and the use
of English in official correspondence.

They reluctantly conceded the

opening of the Yangtze River to trade.

To forestall the opening of

China, the authorities requested that Europeans refrain from claiming
their right of access to the Yangtze until It was freed from rebel
64
65
influence*
The Chinese resisted granting envoys residence at Peking,
which entailed a drastic change in their system of foreign relations.
The English Insisted upon this point, as they had long considered it
essential to proper diplomatic intercourse between China and England.
Unable to resist, the Chinese j'ielded.

The final treaty draft contained

five clauses that strongly affected future Sino™British relations.
Under Article III, the British diplomat was granted the right of resi
dence at Peking, and in Article V, the Chinese acknowledged British
claims to diplomatic equality.

Britain received most-favored-nation

status through Article LIV, and the right of tariff revision through
Article XXVI.
66
to trade.

Article X contained provisions for opening the Yangtze

On 26 June 1857, the English Treaty of Tientsin was signed,

subject to ratification one year later at Peking,
The treaty represented a major step toward opening China to
foreign influence.

Chinese and British alike realized the importance

of permitting envoys residence at Peking; China would lose its tradi
tional status as a tribute-nation.

Opposition to Westernization of

their diplomatic relations was not merely Chinese "arrogance"..

The

dynasty sough* to protect a political and cultural heritage against

53
foreign encroachment.

Determined to establish Free Trade in China, the

British demanded diplomatic access to Peking as a means of resolving
commercial problems.

The treaty was an instrument for regularizing

commerce and preventing the Imperial government from wielding arbitrary
authority over British traders.

Although reluctant to permit Western

influence in China, the Imperial government was too weak to resist.
Prior to the Treaty of Tientsin, duties levied on goods in transit
varied among .districts, an irregularity irksome to British traders. The
English resolved this problem by requiring publication of transit duties
at the portsf and obtaining the right to commute the duties by paying a

67
small percentage of the value of goods in transit.

When the British

completed the negotiations for tariff reform, a five-percent general
duty was levied on commodities not specifically mentioned in the tariff.
Opium, legalized under the treaty, commanded a duty of approximately
seven percent,

French authorities preferred a low duty on silk, a.s

they were most interested in that commodity; the duty remained well

68 The Chinese retained the

below the standard five-percent ad valorem.
duty previously levied on tea.

Although the tea duty was considerably

higher than the standard rate, the English, levied duties on tea in
69
England that compensated for the rate paid in China.

The duties were

compromises designed to satisfy both the Chinese and. the treaty powers.
The English and Chinese appended, rules to the tariffs as additional
safeguards to regular trade. In consideration of the i"ebellion existing
in China, munitions and implements of war were declared contraband goods,
while a uniform customs administration based, upon the Shanghai system
70
was to be established at each port.

After years of futile diplomacy,

54
the British achieved treaty revision through force. Trade was regulated
by law, and the channels of diplomatic intercourse opened.

The English

thought that they finally had induced the Manchus to recognise their
right of Free Trade.
Two problems remained that marred the English success in treaty
revision:

the continued agitation against foreigners at Canton, and

the difficulty of opening the Yangtze to trade.

Foreign Secretary

Malmesbury was dissatisfied with the mixed government of French,
English, and Chinese authorities at Canton.

He ordered the city placed

7'i
under martial law,
but then gave Elgin discretion to modify his instriaetions.1 ~ By the end of 1858, the city was comparatively tranquil.
Upon receiving the right to navigate the Yangtze, the British were
eager to reconnoiter the area and select new ports to be opened. In
exchange for permission to navigate the Yangtze up to Hankow, Elgin
agreed to reconunend that the British government establish its envoy
outside Peking, This agreement was not recorded in official documents,7^
^ but in a despatch to Malmesbury, Elgin referred to the problems
associated with his proposed mission.
The Treaty-right to navigate the Yang-tze, and to resort to
ports upon that river for purposes of trade, was . . . made contin
gent on the re-establishment of the Imperial authority in the ports
in question; becat'se, as we have seen fit to affect neutrality
between the Emperor of China and the rebels, we could not . . .
require him to give us rights and protection in places actually
occupied by a Power which we treat with the same respect as his
own.'' *
Elgin knew that he had no right to navigate the river until ratification
of the Treaty of Tientsin. He thought it necessary, however, to
publicise the opening of the river to foreign trade by an ostensible
75
tour cf inspection among the ports.

Elgin's mission on the Yangtze

55
River refocused British attention onto the Taiping rebels, long-ignored
as a waning influence during the period of treaty revision.
Elgin considered it "essential to the proper appreciation of our
position . » . that we should obtain . . . more accurate information
than we possessed as to the situation and prospects of the parties to
the civil war. ..."

While he observed a lack of popular support

for either the rebels or the Imperialists/ Elgin reported that the
government forces held more of the Yangtze district than the rebels.77
The Taipings' control of their districts was precarious.

"The rebels

do not appear in any part to command . . . /the Yangtze/ beyond the
range of their guns.

Nowhere did we see any rebel junks, and both

78
Nankin and Ngan-ching were closely beleaguered by Imperial fleets."
The river cities were decimated by rebels and Imperialists; Elgin
found little evidence of thriving commercial activity.

He reported.

that Chinkla.ng "has been taken and retaken ana has experienced therefore
the tend.er mercies both of rebels and Imperialists. I never before saw
such a scene of desolation. . . .

With certain differences of degree,

this was the condition of every city which I visited on my voyaget . . .

79

Elgin's trip up the Yangtze and his lengthy report on

the Taipings were not prepatory for subsequent British intervention in
the rebellion. The British sought only to gain information on the
prospects ox the river trade, and to reassure the Chinese of their good
will. The rebel occupation, however, clearly was unconducive to the
security of trade.
In spite of Elgin's wish to avoid a confrontation with them, the
8o
Taipings fired upon a British ship bearing the flag of truce.

The

56
British returned the fire and the following day, they renewed battering
the Taiping forts. In his despatch to Malmesbury, Elgin explained his
actions.
Although the rebel.s had had a good deal the worst of it in the
transactions of the afternoon /of the first exchange/, it was
impossible to say what view they might take of the result, if . . .
we were to proceed quietly on our voyage. ... It was equally
impossible to say in what guise we might present ourselves on our
return, or what inconveniences might arise if the rebels had. any
doubt as to whether we or they were the stronger party. It wa.s
therefore determined that we should re-descend the river . . . and
punish severely some of the forts which had fired upon us,®1i
Although the British exchanged fire with the Taipings, Elgin was
prepared to assure them that the British had. no intention of intervening
82
in the civil war.
Except for a minor incident, the British remained
unmolested, for the rest of their journey.

Despite the Taipings' de

struction of the river cities, the British selected three new ports to
be opened;

Chinkiang, Kiukiang, and Hankow.

By provision of the Treaty

of Tientsin, only Chinkiang could immediately be opened as a port of
trade.

Kiukiang and. Hankow would be opened to trade when the river was

cleared of the rebels,

Although the Taipings impaired the expansion of

trad.e- the British had no desire to intervene in the civil ws,r to
advance their interests on the Yangtze River.
Before receiving Elgin's report on the Taipings, Malmesbury
instructed Lord Frederick Bruce on his conduct toward the Manchu author
ities if they requested assistance against the rebels.

Bruce's diplo

matic status enabled him to assume Bowring's position as Superintendent
of Trade, and to negotiate with the Chinese.
explained his views on the rebellion,

Malmesbury carefully

"It would certainly be desirable,"

he acknowledged, "that peace should be restored to the interior . 0 .

5?
/of China/ and . . . navigation of the Yangzekeang . . . opened to
foreign intercourse; "but . . . it is impossible to judge whether any
attempt to serve the purposes of the . . , /imperial/ Government by
contributing to suppress , . . /the rebellion/ might not do more harm
83
than good." -

Although it was difficult to use British naval power

against scattered rebel groups, Malmesbury thought that capturing a few
rebel strongholds might constitute adequate assistance to the Imperial
84
government.
Malmesbury, however, cautioned Bruce that "Her Majesty's
Government would not be disposed to enter upon such a course without
previous concert with and without the assured cooperation of its
85
allies."
He admitted that the British had little knowledge of the
rebels' position, but d.ecided that the rebellion- was too widespread for
the allied powers to quell.

"At the present state of our knowledge,"

he concluded, "it would not be proper . . . to encourage any expectation
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of material assistance on our part."

As they awaited further infor-

laation on the rebels, the British returned to the problera of treaty
ratification.
In accordance with Elgin's suggestion, the British government
established its envoy at Shanghai, but required that the Chinese occa
sionally receive him at Peking.

Malmesbury insisted that Bruce "make

the Chinese authorities . . « understand that Her Majesty's Government
do not renounce the right of permanent residence /at Peking/, and « . .
will instantly exercise it, if . . , difficulties are thrown in the
way of communications between Hex' Majesty's Minister and the Central
Government « . » or any disposition /is/ shown to evade .
Treaty,"0'

On 26 April, Bruce arrived in Hong Kong,

t

, the

In June, he

reported that the Chinese were using tactics to delay treaty ratification.

88

Instead of going to Peking to receive Bruce and the French

envoy, M. de Bourboulon, the Imperial commissioners lingered at Soochow.
Bruce expressed his displeasure with the Chinese authorities and
emphasized his determination to exchange treaty ratifications at
89
Peking.
year.

He anticipated the problems Elgin experienced the previous

Bruce requested that Rear-Admiral Hope ascertain if preparations

were made to receive the French and British envoys at Tientsin.

"Should

the reply be in the negative," Bruce said, "I would suggest that . . .
/the Chinese/ should be called upon to transmit the intelligence to
Pekin, warning them at the same time that if a reply is not received
within a certain fixed period, the Imperial Government will be held
90
responsible for the consequences."
Shanghai for Peking*

The Chinese commissioners left

On 20 June, the foreign envoys, joined by the

American plenipotentiary John Ward, arrived a t Taku.
The Chinese closed the Peiho River.

"The rabble on the shore

asserted that there were no officers in the /Taku/ forts, which were.
Manned solely by militia, and had been reconstructed by the people as
protection against rebels, not by order of the Government for the
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purpose of keeping the Allied forces out of the river." ~

Bruce ignored

these assertions, recognizing the fortifications at Taku. as an attempt
by the court, war-faction to halt the envoys' progress.

He considered

it imperative to proceed to Tientsin, which entailed defeating the
forces at the Peiho.

Bruce sought to discredit the war-faction and

"impress the Chinese with a just idea of our- national power and equality.
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The envoys requested Rear~Adm.iral Hope to open the Peiho.

On

59
2-f- June, Hope sent an ultimatum to the Chinese, which they ignored.
The Chinese successfully resisted the subsequent British attack.

"The

prestige of British arms suffered a serious "blow, while the credit of
93
the war party among the Chinese was now fully established." -

Ward

left the French and British envoys to conclude ratification of the
American treaty at Peitang.

As the French forces were in Annam, the

French minister relied upon British military power to enforce his
government's claim to treaty ratification.

Embarrassed, the English

and French envoys returned to Shanghai,
Chinese resistance to treaty ratification placed the British In a
difficult situation.

The English persistently regarded China as a

sovereign state, attempting to draw the Imperial government into Western
modes of diplomacy.

Bruce observed that "in China international re-

lations have been always studiously ignored by the Government; and. in
no single instance has a Foreign Minister succeeded in obtaining
admission to the capital, except on performance of the 'kotow,' or
oZj.
ceremony of vassalage, or in the character of tribute-bearer."''
The
British rejected Chinese modes of diplomacy and became increasingly
determined to humble the government.

Bruce urged the new Foreign

Secretary, Lord John Sussell, to send a large force to China to exact
treaty ratification from the Manchus.

"The more manifest our superi

ority the shorter will be the contest, and the more inclined will be
the Emperor to abandon those pretensions of superiority which form the
real obstacle to amicable relations with the Government and the people
OK

01

China.."

In conjunction with the French, Russell agreed to dispatch

military aid to achieve ratification *

OQ

The British, however, sought

6o
a limited campaign against the Imperial government,

"There are no

reasons," Russell asserted, "for interrupting friendly relations with
97
the Chinese at Shanghae, Canton, and elsewhere."
The Foreign
Secretary thought -that news of British preparations for war might deter
98
the Chinese from, further hostilities,.

While anxious to ratify the

treaty, the English cautiously avoided an expensive large-scale war,
which would disrupt tx*ade.
Before resorting to force against the Manchus, the British decided
to apply diplomatic pressure.

They demanded that the Chinese apologize

for the Taku incidentf permit the British minister to arrive at Tientsin
in a British vessel, and convey the minister to Peking with due honor to
99
ratify the treaty.

The British revoked their agreement with the

Chinese on residence of foreign envoys in China.
Kith Her Majesty

"It rests henceforward

. to decide whether or not she shall instruct her

100
Minister to take up his abode permanently at Pekln."

In January,

i860, Bruce received a despatch from Russell, instructing him to inform
the Chinese of the British demands and to insist upon the emperor's
101
assent within thirty days.

If the Chinese refused to cooperate, "the

British naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt such
measures as they deem advisable for the purpose of compelling the
Eraperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his

102
Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin. ..."

Russell also instructed Bruce

to exact a large indemnity from the Chinese If they failed to comply
i 'i
with his demands.'"1'

Secure from internal threat to its authority by

the waning of the Taiping Rebellion, the Imperial government could
resist treaty ratification.

The British., however, were thoroughly
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aroused against the government, and the Taipings were about to stage
their last great offensive.

The Manchu dynasty was in grave danger of

collapsing under the strain of war and rebellion.
British policy toward the Imperial government was fraught with
inconsistencies.

Although they wished the government to subdue the

Taiping Rebellion, the British simultaneously weakened it by demands
for treaty revision.

As the authorities failed to tranquilize China,

the British incurred unwanted responsibility for maintaining the
security of trade, which worsened their relations with the Imperial
government.

Weak in central military organization; the Chinese govern

ment was powerless to act eoncertedly against the Taipings or the
European barbarians.

The Manchus were forced to delay treaty revision

for as long as possible, but this only hardened British determination
to exact new treaties.
British negotiations with the Manchus marked their continued
acceptance of Imperial authority.

When the rebellion subsided and the

threat of ratification became Imminent, the Manchus resisted British
demands.

The British, however, had exacted important diplomatic and

trade concessions from the Imperial government, which they insisted the
Manchus honor by ratifying the treaty. The arrangement for Elgin's
journey up the Yangtze constituted the last vestige of cordiality
between the Chinese and British.

The India Mutiny ended in 1859»

enabling the British to coerce the Manchus into complying with their
demands.

The Chinese triumph over the British at Taku, the culmination

of resistance to the treaties, compelled the British to adopt sterner
measures to exact the Manchus* cooperations
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CHAPTER III

THE COURSE TOWARD IOTEEl'ENTION 1860-1861

While the Taiping Rebellion affected Sino-British relations far
more strongly after 1859» the British maintained their precarious,
flawed neutrality for another two years.

Suspicion of the Manchu and

Taiping policies placed them in the awkward position of "balancing the
competing claims of the central government and the rebels.

Although

Sine—British relations slowly improved after ratification of the Treaty
of Tientsin), the British followed a cautious policy toward the govern
ment that had long resisted Western influence.

As" the Taipings

simultaneously reversed their foreign policy, the British viewed this
change with little enthusiasm.

It merely worsened their problem of

maintaining neutrality while establishing better relations with the
Imperial government.

The anomalous position of the English in the

civil war could not last indefinitely; both the Manchus and the Taipings
acted to draw the British toward a course of Intervention,
Although the Manchu court resisted treaty ratification, the
British were committed to the central government through diplomacy and
the hard-won treat3.es.

The humiliation at Taku strengthened British

resolve to exact the Manchus' compliance. To ensure success in humbling
the Manchus, Bruce delayed his ultimatum to the Imperial government
until he could act in concert with the French, and obtain adequate
military assistance.

Despite the Anglo-French alliance and the threat
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of force, the Chinese refused to comply with Bruce's ultimatum.

Foreign

Secretary Russell had prepared Instructions for war against China.

The

naval and military "forces were to rendezvous in Hong Kong, an AngloFrench occupation of Chusan was to be effectedj, grain junks to be
stopped, and points on the Gulf of Pechili as the Admirals might desire
1
for Dases were to be seized and the Takoo forts attacked.."

Russell

also ordered a blockade of the Yangtze River and the coast north of it."
In February, i860, Lord Elgin was reappointed as the special ambassador
to Chins., completing British preparations for war0

It was not until

June, however; that the English began their military campaign in China
to achieve- treaty ratification.
The Taiping Rebellion complicated the proposed mission to Peking.
Under the guidance of Hung Jen-kan, Taiping Prime Minister, the insur
rection regained enough ardor to threaten the dynasty.

The English

feared that excessively harsh, measures against the Manchus, coupled
with the Taiping Rebellion, would precipitate the dynasty's fall and
invite chaos in China.

Russell expressed his concern over the problems

that might arise from an allied assault on Peking.
Abandoning his capital upon the advance of European troops,
condemned, to admit the superiority of Fowers whom the Court of
China, in its fatuity, has hitherto treated with contempt, the
Emperor would suffer greatly in reputation.
The rebels would take heart; the great officers of the Empire
might find it difficult to maintain the central authority; the
Governors of Provinces might hardly be able to quell Insurrection.
, . The bonds of allegiance, once loosened, might never
again be firmly united,,J
As the rebellion entered its final and most intense phase, it increas
ingly affected British policy toward the Manchus.
In 1.559» Hung Jen-kan began to reorganize and revitalize the
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dissipated Taiping movement.

Pie revised Taiping theology and encouraged
h

bialical studies as part, of the civil service examination.

While

rationalizing Taiping Christianity, Hung Jen-kan "broadened rebel
ideology to gain support from the Chinese scholar-gentry."

He attempted

to reorganize the rebel government, and suggested reforms for China's
modernization.^
policy.

His program entailed a shift in the rebels' foreign

Willie the Heavenly King insisted upon exacting hommage from

foreigners, Hung Jen-kan recognized the importance of national equality
in diplomacy.7 To win support for the Taiplngs, Hung Jen-kan attempted
to reverse the Heavenly King's policies.

He cultivated the favor of

missionaries and tried to open foreign relations with the Western
Powers.

His reforms were doomed to failure.

The Chinese -scholar-gentry

and Western officials were entrenched in their prejudice against the
rebels.

Hung Jen-kan's program nevertheless x*einvigorated the Taiping

movement and renewed British interest in the rebel cause. The Taiplngs*
emergence from Nanking, and their new foreign policy complicated the
British position in the civil war.
Desperate for- supplies, the Taiplngs began to move outward from
Nanking, capturing Soochow, Hangchow, and Changchow.

Their invasion

cci.ncided with the opening of the silk season, a. period, in silk-culture
that requires continuous labor.

Consul Sinclair informed Bruce that

"Much inconvenience is apprehended from this temporary and possibly
g

prolonged interruption to that trade."

The Taiplngs' advance into

Chekiang province began the ruin of China's silk trade and renewed
British alarm fcr the safety of Shanghai.

To protect the city, Chinese

authorities requested foreign assistance.

Bruce, having heard of the
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rebels* destructiveness at Hangchow, agreed to defend Shanghai in concert
with the Frencho

He thought that

without taking any part in this civil contest ... we might protect
Shanghae from attack, and assist the authorities in preserving
tranquillity within its walls, on the ground of its being a port
open to trade, and of the intimate connection existing between the
interests of the town and of the foreign, settlement. . . . We
accordingly issued separate proclamations to that effect in
identical terms. ... I have declined, all suggestions to extend
the protection further than to the city itself.9
Bruce's policy represented an unmeditated revival of Clarendon's plan
to protect Shanghai in '1856, and constituted no dramatic break in
British policy toward the rebels.

British officials' primary con

sideration was protection of their trade interests„

Bruce was confident

that news of the Anglo-French protection of Shanghai would deter a rebel
V

assault, * but he underestimated the Taipings' determination to attack
the city.
Bruce knew that defense of Shanghai would place the allies in an
anomalous position.

At war with the Imperial government in the norths

the British simultaneously would be defending its interests in the
south, if the Taipings assaulted Shanghai.

Bruce viewed the problem

with trepidation as he realized that intervention in the civil war
might endanger the Peking expeditions

He refused "to intervene beyond

the legitimate protection of foreign interests, without a previous
statement of our differences with the Court, and a distinct under
standing' with the Government as to the extent and nature of the assis12
tance that is to be rendered."

Bruce was concerned that England

would lose prestige if the British appeared to serve the Imperial
government in repulsing the Taipings.

"No coarse could be so well

calculated to lower our national reputation," he wrote, "as to lend
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material support to a Government, the corruption of whose authorities
13
is only checked by its weakness,"

The solution to this dilemma lay

in regeneration of the Imperial government under British guidance.
Until the Manchus were amenable to foreign Influence, however, the
British avoided intervention.
As the Imperial authorities and the Taiplngs beset them with
diplomatic overtures, the British position in the civil war became
increasingly difficult.

The mandarins again requested Intervention,

arguing that this would reassure the emperor of Britlslri friendliness
toward China.

Brace coolly responded that if the Chinese wanted

assistance, they should immediately settle their differences with the
English, and send their own troops from the north to the southern
provinces.

ill,

He wished to avoid incurring responsibility for quelling

the. rebellions and to conclude the Slno-British war*

Under Hung Jen-

kan's Influence, the Taipings reversed their policy of non-Intercourse
with foreigners, and renewed attempts at friendly diplomatic relations
with the treaty powers.

Bruce enjoined Consul Meadows against respond

ing to Hung Jen-kan*s invitation to confer at Soochow, considering such
action "inexpedient and objectionable on principle."

He feared that

if foreigners displayed sympathy for the rebel cause, they would
16
encourage the Taipings to approach Shanghai.,'

He notified the rebels

that the Anglo-French forces were instructed to hold the city in a
military occupation.

Defense of Shanghai would constitute "a purely

military measure, whereas any declaration .. . . would be neither quite
consistent with the state of . . . our diplomatic functions at present
. , . nor could it be framed to avoid, some . . . opinion on the desire
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the Insurgents have manifested to enter into relations with us,"
While diplomatic and strategic considerations prevented Bruce from
openly rejecting the rebels' offer of friendly intercourse, he expressed
contempt for their religion, leadership, and policies.

"The prospects

of the extension of pure Christianity . . . and the success of the
insurrection . . . have suffered materially from the religious character
r . . /Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's/ leadership has imparted to it.'f

The

Taipings' religious dogma, Bruce observed, deprived them of support
among the Chinese, transferring "to the Tartars . . . the prestige of
upholding traditions and principles against the assaults of a numeri19
eally insignificant sect."

He deplored the inability of the Taiping

leaders to organize a system of government in their captured cities.^
The Taipings' destructiveness increasingly conflicted with British trade
interests, which depended upon security of property,
Hung Jen-kan's reform of Taiping administration.

Bruce dismissed

"Every day shows more

strongly that no principles or ideas of policy animate . . . /the rebel/
leaders.

Even the extermination of the Tartars , . . seems rather a

pretext for upsetting all government and authority . . . than ... a
21
step toward establishing a , . . national government."

Like £owring,

Bruce considered the Taipings incapa/ble of ruling China.

As he feared

that the rebels' occupation of Shanghai would ruin trade., Bruce was
"little inclined, to attach weight to their assurances of respecting
foreign persons or property or to allow them if it can be helped to
obtain possession of the city.""' Although they wished to avoid con
flict with the Taipings, the British were prepared to defend their
trade interests.

On 19 August, the rebels assaulted Shanghai.
troops repulsed them.
draw,

British and Indian

After three days of fighting, the Taipings with

In his despatch to Russell, Bruce explained that "some persons

advocated taking the offensive against the Insurgents, but the Commander
. . « considering the smallness of our forces, the season, and the
danger of insurrection in the city, decided on maintaining a strictly
Politically speaking . . . this was the . . .

defensive attitude.

course .. . » least calculated, to fetter the proceedings of the Ambas23
sadors in the North."

The French and British assumed a military

2b
occupation of Snanghai, warning the rebels against further assaults.
While Bruce had no wish to disturb Sino-British relations at Peking, he
proposed to take offensive measures against the rebels if they renewed
25
attacks on Shanghai.

Upon receiving requests for assistance against

the rebels, however, he cautiously declined to extend British protection
beyond the city.

Lord Russell entirely .approved Bruce's conduct
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toward the rebels.

In view of the anomalous situation with the

Imperial government and the Taipings* retreat from Shanghai, Bruce
adhered to the policy of protecting British trade, although it involved
serving the Manchus* interests.
V.liile the British prepared to defend Shanghai, they began their
campaign agaiiist the Imperial government.

Bruce declined to blockade

%
the Gulf of Chihli, considering the seizure of grain-junks detrimental
to trade.

Russell agreed that "the more the pressure is put upon the

Gov/ernmen/t of China, and the less it is made to bear on those engaged
in trade (provided the object is attained) the better."

28

Early in the

year the allies had occupied Chusan, and in June, they hastened, final

preparations for war. In August, the Anglo-French forces landed at
Pehtang and prepared to assault the Taku forts.

On the same day that

the British repulsed the Taipings in the south, the Taku forts fell.
Strained Anglo-French relations, and the anomalous defense of Shanghai,
led the allies to seek a speedy resolution of the China problem.
prepared a draft convention to be settled at Tungchow.
cations were to be exchanged at Peking.

They

Treaty ratifi

The Chinese, however, objected

"to three points in the proposed arrangements!

the indefiniteness in

the date of withdrawing the /allied/ troops, Lord Elgin's intention of
taking to Peking the full escort which he would take to Tungchow, and
the delivery of the queen's letter to the emperor at an audience.

They

pQ

chiefly insisted on their objection to the last."Diplomacy might
have settled these issues, but the Chinese committed a gross error.
Indifferent to their flag of truce, the Chinese captured the British
delegate l£r. Parkes and several others, wrongly assuming that Parkes
possessed diplomatic authority, and could halt the allied advance on

30 This action enraged Elgin, and seriously impaired Sine-

Peking.

British relations.
Prince Eung, brother of the emperor, insisted upon retaining the
hostages until the allied forces withdrew and peace negotiations began.
While French forces sacked the Imperial1, summer palace, Elgin threatened
to take Peking if the prisoners were not released.

Under persistent

military threat, the Chinese? surrendered the Anting gate of Peking.
"So peaceable a solution was welcome to the higher officers in the
allied camp, who realised that, with the means c.t their disposal, it
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was no slight task to breach the mighty walls of the Chinese capital."

76
The Chinese had killed several of their captives, hut Parkes and twelve
others were released.

ELgin ordered the burning of the summer palace

in retaliation for the Chinese insult.
reassert British prestige.

His action was calculated to

He "had reason . . , to believe that it was

an act -which . . . /would/ produce a greater effect in China, and on the
Emperor, than persons who look on from a distance may suppose.

It was

the Emperor*s favorite residence," Elgin explained, "and its destruction
could not fail to be a blow to his pride. . . .
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Humiliated and

defeated, the Imperial government ratified the British Treaty of
Tientsin on Zk October I860.

On the same day, Chinese authorities

signed the Convention of Peking, by which they apologised for the Taku
incident, and agreed to pay a large indemnity to the British.

ICowloori

Point was ceded to the British crown and Tientsin was opened to tra.de.
British occupation of Taku, Canton, Shantung, and Tientsin would
continue until the indemnities were paid.

By undermining the dynas

ty's sovereignty, the British achieved their long-sought diplomatic and
trade concessions.
Prior to ratificat5.cn of the Treaty of Tientsin, the emperor fled
to Jehol with the court war-faction.

The British had long-anticipated

his flight b, and. feared the dynasty would, collapse under such humiliating
circuastances.
relations.

The emperor*s flight, however, eased Sino-British

It "served to maintain tho new political equilibrium in,

which the peace party was now able to have a decisive voice. . . . The
ad hoc machinery for peace negotiations under Prince Kung was . » . inOh.

stitutio;ialised as a formal standing organ for foreign affairs."-^ The
f.sungli Yamem, or the Office of General Administration, placed

Sino-British relations on terms of diplomatic equality0

Establishment

of the Tsungli Yamen in 1861 did not dispel the court's anti-foreignism
nor did it complete the Imperial government's adaptation of Western
modes of diplomacy.

Yet it created "an institutional change in « « «

/China's/ conduct of foreign affairs, ending the traditional principle
of inequality between the Chinese empire and all other states, which
35
had been institutionalized in the tribute system."
Prince Kung's
diplomacy slowly improved Sino-British relations.
In I860, there was no agreement between Manchu and British offi
cials to subdue the Taiping Rebellion,

The British preferred to place

the responsibility of tranquilizing China upon the Imperial government.
In a meeting with Prince Kungs Bruce "urged upon him the necessity of
immediate steps being taken to restore the authority of the Imperial
Government . . , and represented to him that he was misled in supposing
that our interest would lead us to hold Shanghae for the Imperialists,, » .

While they wished to protect their trade, the British

were reluctant to incur expensive military obligations in China, The
emperor's war-faction at Jehol represented a continued-resistance to
European influence, which Bruce resented. The British remained in
their anomalous position of defending the interests of a hostile govern
merit "against the insurgents whose professions and declarations-at. all
»
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events were couched in a friendly spirit."
In his earlier correspon
dences Bruce had expressed disgust with the rebels*

He used an oblique

threat of favoring the rebel cause as a means of exacting the Manchus'
cooperation.

Anxious to draw the Manchus into Western diplomacy, Bruce

suggested that they establish an ambassador in England "as a pledge

78
of . . . /their/ intention ... to conduct their foreign relations in
">•8

a different spirit,British reluctance to intervene, coupled with
their suspicion of the Manchus' policies prevented Sino-British coopera
tion against the Taipings.
Although British concern for the security of trade intensified in
1861, they remained uncommitted to a policy of direct intervention
against the Taipings, The defense of Shanghai was an embarrassing
compromise of British neutrality.

The English, however, justified

their action as a defense of their interests, and affected neutrality
elsewhere In the civil war.

Bruce insisted upon protecting Shanghai,

"until the Insurgents have sufficiently established their superiority
to enable us to consider the contest as respects that part of China at
'jq
an end.With Russell's approval., Consul Meadows rejected the French
40
propose.! to extend the radius of military protection at Shanghai.
sJhen the Taipings threatened the treaty port of Ningpo, Bruce enjoined
Consul Sinclair from extending British protection to the city.

He

instructed Sinclair "to take such measures as may appear expedient
• . . for the security of foreigners.

Your language should be that we

take no part in this civil contest,—but that we claim exemption from
Zj-i
Injury and arrogance at the hands of both parties. . . ."
t-2

approved Bruce11 s policy. '

Russell

With the exception of Shanghai, Clarendon's

earlier instructions on defense of the port cities remained in abeyance.
-Jhile there -;?as no distinct break in their policy toward the Taipings,

i

It "became increasingly difficult for the British to separate their
interests from those of the Manchus, which led, them closer to direct
intervention.
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The Taiping Rebellion continued to disrupt trade, forcing the
English into contact with the rebels tc ensure security of their
interests.

Although supplies of sillt remained constant, the import

/.n
trade considerably slackened, -

The rebels capture of Soochow "ren

dered it most desirable to find an uninterrupted channel of communication
kk

with the Western Provinces of China,."

Bruce therefore proposed that

the Yangtze be opened to trade, all.though this was contrary to provisions
of the Treaty of Tientsin, Prince Kung assented. In February, 1861.,
Admiral Hope undertook his first expedition up the Yangtze to meet with
the Taiplngs.
The rebels agreed not to attack Shanghai for one year, and allowed
British traders access tc Hankow and Kiukiang.
h5

their neutrality.

The British pledged

Nevertheless, the conference confirmed the official

British view of the Taipings5 aversion to commerce,

"They don't in any

way encourage trade, excepting in fire-arms and gunpowder.
well as steamers, they are anxious to buy.

These, as

They pretend, a willingness

to facilitate trade . . . but . . . these soft speeches were merely to
if-6
gain cn.tr goodwill."

Absorbed in war with the Manchus, the Taipings

paid attention to trade only to avert .English hostility.
d.estructiveness appall.ed the British.

Their

"They are too ignorant to conduct

war on scientific principles, and. /to/" aim at becoming masters of the
country with the least possible Injury to the great centres of
trade, . , . Experience shows us that the insurgents in taking possess.ion of a commercial city ruin it as an emporium of trade." '

Although

Bruce was adverse to diplomatic relations with the Taipings, expansion
of British interests necessitated limited intercourse with them.

He

simultaneously wished to exempt the treaty ports from attack, and tc
avoid endangering Sino-British relations by appearing too friendly
48
toward the Taipings.

Bruce was in a most awkward situation, to which

the home government offered no immediate solution.
"While awaiting developments in the civil war, Russell avoided the
appearance of collusion with the Manchus..

He instructed Bruce to enjoir

the Chinese authorities against further payment of British troops at
Shanghai.

"This arrangement may lead to misapprehension and may induce

the Imperialists to suppose that we are prepared to quit CUT1 neutral
bn

position and. take part with them in the Civil War."

In July, Russell

instructed Bruce to establish the neutrality of the treaty ports, and
to refrain from using force against the Taipings except to protect
British subjects and property.

50

In September, he suggested that "it

might be expedient to defend the Treaty Ports if the Chinese would
consent not to use those Ports for purposes of aggression."
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Russell's

proposal to exclude the Chinese from direct involvement in defense of
the treaty ports nevertheless compromised the British in favor of
Manchu interests.

Resolution of this chronic dilemma lay in the unifi

cation of Chinese and British interests, which began under Prince
Kung5 s influence.
The emperor's death at Jehol in August, 1861, initiated a power
struggle between the war-faction of Prince I and the peace-faction of
Prince ~K\uig,

with the emperor's concubine Yehonala, Prince Kung

achieved a coup d'etat, establishing her as Empress Dowager, a title
she shared with the emperor's consort.

Yehonala assumed the name Tis'u-

hsi, and ruled in the stead of her young son, T'ung-chih.

To retain

her power, Ts'u-hsi reversed her anti-foreign stance to accord with
Prince Kung's policy of conciliation.

Tz'u-hsi alone could not have

enabled Prince Kung to achieve the coup d'etat or unification of the
Grand Councj.l and the Tsungli Yamen.

"Had there not been Western

support for the conciliatory conduct of foreign affairs by Prince Kung
and his associates, they might not have dared to take bold measures.
They would also have found if difficult to stabilize the political
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situation after the coup d'etat.""

The Imperial government increas

ingly depended upon the treaty powers to maintain its authority.
Although the British avoided assuming direct political control in China,
their interest in trade compelled them to develop closer ties with the
Imperial government.

With Prince Kung as the arbitor of foreign policy,

the 'tension inherent in Sino-British relations gradually diminished.
Foreign legations were established at Peking in March, 1861,
facilitating diplomatic intercourse with the Chinese.

The Imperial

authorities accepted extension of the Foreign Inspectorate system to
the treaty ports.

By 186l, the Inspectorate was established at Canton,

Shanghai,- Swatow, Chinkiang, Ningpo, Foochow, Kiukiang, and Hankow. In
subsequent years other ports were provided with Foreign Inspectorates,"^
Sino-British relations greatly improved through the influence of Robert
Hart, director of the Foreign Inspectorate. Hart supported the Tsungli
Yamen and advised Prince Kung on political matters.

Under his manage

ment, the Foreign Inspectorate system provided the Imperial government
with the revenue necessary to consolidate its authority. Indirect
assistance to the government perfectly fitted with British interests.
English trade interests required establishment of peace and
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regular government throughout China.

The Tsungli Yamen represented a

considerable improvement in Chinese foreign relations, which strength
ened the government's domestic situation.

Yet the Taiping Rebellion

continued to undermine the dynasty's authority.

To consolidate the

government, the Taiping Rebellion had to- be quelled.

'"I do not think

that order , „ . can be permanently restored," Bruce wrote, "unless the
Imperial Government, regains it's /sic/ prestige among the people by some
proof of it's vigour and power as would be afforded by it's successful
action against the Insurgents,
assisting the dynasty.
ness was evident.
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Bruce wanted no part in directly

Nevertheless the government's military weak

"Neither in equipment nor In organization are their

troops better than the banditti and rabble who . . . set the Imperial
Authority at defiance." 57

The incompetence of the Manchu forces

resulted in difficulties for British traders-.

The Taipings held, the

silk districts and levied duties on silk brought into their territory.
British merchants complained that duty payment afforded them no protection, nor did it exempt them fx*om further duties en route.
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While

the British avoided military commitments to the Manchus, It became
.Increasingly clear that the government could neither subdue the
rebellion with its own resources, nor afford adequate protection to
British trade.
In December, 1861, the Taipings captured Ningpo. The British,
took nc immediate action against them, but waited to ascertain if they
would establish a government and allow trade.

Consul Harvey's reports,

although biased and inaccurate, confirmed the official British view of
ifte rebels' destructiveness and failure to govern.
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After a second

83
trip to Nanking in December, Admiral Hope received no promise from the
Taipings to abstain from attacking the treaty ports or disrupting
British trade on the Yangtze River,^

Hung Jen-kan's policy of conci

liation toward Westerners fell into disrepute, and he was demoted.

As

6l
the autonomous Taiping commanders ignored Hung Jen-kan*s policies,
their military campaigns brought them closer to collision with the
British,.

At the end of 1861, the British verged on intervention.

While the British gradually became reconciled to the Imperial
government after ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin, essentially
they maintained their established policy toward the Taipings,

Indemni

ties and the treaty bound the English closer to the central government,
but they avoided displaying their anxiety about the dynasty's future if
rebellion continued,,

Their cautious policy enabled the British, to evade

significant military commitments to the dynasty, while they awaited a
change in the Manchus® foreign, policy.

Although the coup d'gtat and

reforms of Prince Kung greatly improved Sino-British relations, the
British avoided intervention, as they feared an anti-foreign reaction,
among the Imperial authorities. The Taipings' conduct forced the
British to assume greater responsibility for defense of the dynasty's
interests.

The rebels' antagonism and the Manchus' conciliation led

the British to favor the Imperia-l cause, in spite of the defects they
observed in the central government.
The defense of Shanghai in I860 was not a turning point in British
policy. The primary considerations of British officials continued to
be protection of the foreign settlements and their trade interests.^
British neutrality had been imperfect fcr several years, but defense of

Shanghai, marked, a greater bias in favor of the Imperial cause.

Although

the Shanghai crisis constituted another step toward intervention, it
was a local solution to a local problem.

Only when the Taipings*

l'epeated threats tc British trade became intolerable, and the Manchus
showed themselves amenable to European influence in their armies, did
the British directly assist the Imperial government.
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CHAPTER IV

lOTERVEOTl'ON AM) REFORM 1862-1864

In 1862,. the British openly became partisans of the Imperial
cause, considering an alliance with the central, government the best
means of advancing their tra.de interests.

Confirmed in their view that

rebellion was inimical to trade, the British hesitantly adopted a course
of Intervention.

British officials attempted to place responsibility

for subduing the rebellion upon the central government.

Although regen

eration of the Imperial government enabled the dynasty to regain its.
sovereignty9 primarily it served British Free Trade Interests,
The Taipings appeared unable to govern or guarantee the safety of
trade.

British interests rested upon security of property, which the

Taipings did not afford.

"We cannot look upon the advance of the

Insurgents with any feeling but that of regret," Bruce wrote, "as long
as their conduct to the native population is such that every respectable
Chinaman flies from the places occupied by them, and declines to put
1
his person and property within their power,"

While occupying Ningpo,

the Taipings threatened Shanghai, despite their agreement to avoid
attacking the city.

They assured the treaty powers they would respect

foreign settlements, but insisted that occupation of the Chinese city

2 The British had long considered the city of

was vital to their cause.

Shanghai an integral part of their trade interest; thejr were most
anxious to maintain its security.

The rebels' promises to them

increasingly met with disbelief.
As Shanghai's vulnerability increased, British alarm intensified.
The rebels stopped the flow of supplies into the city* and Bruce feared
that "the insurgents will be emboldened by cur pass.ivo.ness and their
success at Ningpo, to press us still closer. ... In ray opinion," he
stated, "we are perfectly justified in taking the offensive against the
insurgents . . . provided we can deal such a blow as is likely to keep
3
them at a respectable distance."

4
Russell concurred.

In February,

Admiral Hope had provided naval support to the Imperial authorities at
Shanghai.

At the end of April, British, French, and Chinese forces

combined to clear the rebels from a thirty-mile radius around Shanghai.
Bruce insisted that the Chinese take defensive measures to protect
Ehaxighai f:com subsequent attacks.^

To avoid rendering large amounts of

military aid to the government; Bruce urged the Chinese to assume an
Much responsibility as "possible in the civil war.

He was reluctant to

go beyond protection of Shanghai, and Russell approved his conduct.1"
In Kayj British and French naval forces bombarded Ningpo, routing the
Taipings and delivering the city to the Imperialists.meat approved the taking of Ningpo.!
rebels,.

The home govern-

Russell had lost patience with th

"The Taepings," he wrote, "are incapable of establishing a

regular authority., or of giving protection to peaceable inhabitants of
the country they over-run with their savage hord.es, . . .

Her Majesty'

Government therefore consider it a duty . . . tc favour the restoration
r>

1
t.O
oiJ" order.
British officials, particularly Lord. Bruce, sought a limited
engagement against the Taipings, based upon protection of British
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interests,

Russell instructed Bruce to ensure defense of" the treatjr

ports, adding that "British commerce should have the aid of Her Majesty's
o
Slips of War.'!'

More cautious than Russell, Bruce was troubled "by the

obvious bias in favor of the Manchus which defense of the ports
entailed,
If the Ports are only to be neutral in this sense,—that they are
not to be attacked, and that the Imperialists are not to make them
the base of operations, but . . . may continue to use the resources
to be derived from the possession of these towns ... it is clear
that they would be gainers by the arrangements and that we would be
open to the charge of unfairness, in proposing, under the mask of
neutrality, an arrangement decidedly advantageous to one Party.^0
Bruce apparently considered the thirty-mile radius of Shanghai a purely
defensive measure serving only British interests, and saw no evidence
of "bias in that expedient.

The offensive action later taken at Ningpo

confirmed the British in a course of intervention, which Bruce reluc
tantly endorsed,

Russell adopted a simple, pragmatic policy.

''The

only rational course," he wrote> "is to defend our own trade, to protect
the Treaty Ports, and to encourage the Chinese Gov/ernmen/t to arm a
H
sufficient force . . , to dislodge and rout the Rebels." "

It neces

sitated increased diplomatic and military commitments to the central
government, however, to prod the Chinese into action against the
Taipings»
The British approved Prince Kung's initial reforms, and became
more confident of the government's ability to subdue the rebellion.
Bruce wished the authorit5.es to continue their reforms to strengthen
the government.

"If the Imperial Government can be induced, to enter

boldly on the path of military and financial reform," he wrote, "it
will be successful In crushing the existing anarchy which has its' /sic7
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origin in its'' weakness even more than its' corruption."

Bruce®s

policy was calculated to lessen the problems of foreign governments
dealing with Chinese authorities.

It was not humane, but pragmatic.

The British strongly desired to avoid "another India." It was easier
and less costly to encourage native authorities to govern upon European
principles than to rule in their stead.

Bruce welcomed the opportunity

to assist in. Westernizing the Imperial government.

He was satisfied

with his progress in convincing the authorities of "the advantages to
be derived from the adoption of European improvements . . . for, sincere
conviction on these points is the only security against reaction, should
this Government recover strength enough to suppress anarchy in
4O
China. ... In short, improvement must be adopted, not imposed."
The British sought to lead the Chinese toward 'what they considered a
"better system of government, and in doing so, to advance their interests.
To complete the regeneration of the central government and to
protect British trade, it became necessary to reform the Ch'ing military
system.

The British had long held the Chinese army In contempt.

Brace

deplored the provincial military system, which prevented concerted
In
action against the Taipings.J"'

The Imperial government, however, was

una ale to manage the system of local forces under the gentry, who
15
controlled a large part of military spending through the likin tax.
''The decline in civil and military power of the central government was
of necessity "balanced by the establishment of local forces.

Prince

Kung had little choice bat to adopt the policy of military decentralij7
aation, which the war-faction had previously advocated..

Bruce sought

to reverse the tread toward decentralization as a means of strengthening

the centra.1 government, and improving Sino-British relations,

"The

Chinese Government should create an Imperial, force . . . a.nd , , . we
should boldly abandon the traditions of our past intercourse, which
have led the consuls to . . . weaken . . . the authority of the Chinese
Executive, and to look upon our position at the Ports, as being dependent, for its security, on the helplessness of the . . . Government.

i.8

Tc avoid an "Eastern Question" in China and to protect British trade
against the Taipings, Bruce advocated instructing the Chinese forces in
Western military techniques.
Bruce requested Brigadier--General Staveley bo assist the Chinese
i9
in organizing their forces."

Unless the Chinese had proper military

equipment their training was useless.

To avoid large military commit

ments to the central government, Eruce considered it necessary to arm
the Chinese forces.

In his despatch to Russell, he reported that- "Tseng

Ivwo-fan /sic/ . . . had expressed opinions similar to mine,—that . „ .
it was necessary to obtain foreign arms, and to use foreign instruction,
though not foreign troops. . .

20

Tseng had. gathered a considerable

military force raider his command, uniting his officers- by an appeal to
Confucianism.

He paid Ms troops well and regularly.

His force tran

scended the limits of a local militia and constituted a strong regional
PA

army, '*

Tseng's desire to limit foreign aid to instruction and weapons
%

was not based upon a desire for personal aggrandizement; he dreaded the
consequences of allowing foreign troops into China,

Tseng feared, that

"unless . , , foreign soldiers were inclined to virtue they might
become a danger within the state, not content after the war to disband
quietly , . . but insisting cn staying to seize a share in China's
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inheritance."

Although motivated by different reasons, Tseng and

Bruce agreed that foreign assistance to the dynasty should remain
limited, permitting the Chinese to assume greater responsibility in
subduing the rebellion.
The British willingly provided the Chinese with material assistance. In March, 1862, Robert Kart instructed Mr. Lay to purchase,
staff', and equip a war flotilla for the Imperial government.

Lay's

mission posed the difficulty of allowing British subjects to enter the
emperor's service.

The Admiralty pragmatically asserted that the

prohibition against Englishmen entering the emperor's service "has
already been virtually abrogated by the recent instructions to British
23
authorities in China. . . ."

With the sanction of the British govern

ment, Lay completed his mission in late 1862, and selected Captain
Sierard Osborn as assistant commander-in-chief.
flotilla arrived in China.

In 1863, the Lay-Osborn

Osborn refused to serve the provincial

authorities, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang. He would serve only the
emperor.

The Imperial authorities could not sanction the independence

that Osborn demanded, nor could they permit such a gross insult to Tseng
and Li.

Osborn quickly dissolved the fleet, infuriating the Chinese

and rendering their1 expenditure fruitless. Lay was dismissed.

2)\-

The

Lay-Osborn flotilla represented an abortive attempt at cooperation
between Chinese and British authorities.

If the British were to succeed

in assisting the central government, they had to consider the Chinese
military structure, adapting themselves to Chinese institutions while
serving their interests.
The work of reforming the Chinese army proceeded slowly.

Anxious
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to maintain control of their forces, the Chinese preferred to adopt
only European weapons.

Bruce realized the difficulty of reorganization,

and contented himself with rudimentary changes.

He did not abandon, the

idea of reform, "bat advocated a policy of gradualism.

"Good fire arms,

with artillery, and a squadron of gunboats would give the Imperialists,
even organized as they are, a great superiority over the insurgents,"
he wrote,

"My efforts at present are directed to induce the Government

to adopt these improvements, and to organise the garrisons of the Ports

?5

. . j on the European plan,"

Russell approved Bruce's policy,

26

As

late as Hovei«ibcxrc 1862, Russell declined to sanction general British
intervention.

He cautioned Bruce to "distinguish those cases in . . .

•which we have a. right and an obligation from those in which we have
neither.

You will call upon Her Majesty's Naval and. Military forces to

protect the Treaty Ports, but not to take part in the operatione of war
pry

at places distant from those Porto.""'

Like Bruce, Russell wished the

Chinese to take the initiative in the war against the Taipings.
Russells however, remained concerned for the safety of British
trade, particularly at Shanghai.

The Taipings* "habits of pillage and.

murder," he said, "would soon put an end to the trade of that city, and
pg
make cur Treaty rights null and void for any practical purpose."After receiving reports that large supplies of munitions were 'being sold
to the rebels,'Russell sanctioned a regulation forbidding British
subjects to sell weapons to them.^

This measure, and assistance to the

Imperial government failed, to allay Russell's concern for British trade.
In January, 1863, the home government issued Orders in Council sanc
tioning employment of British officers in the emperor's service from

OK

s

16 December 1862 through 1 September 186'+,
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While the .British had. no

intention of abandoning reform of the Chinese troops, the use of foreign
officers was calculated to hasten the Taipings' defeat.
The decision to permit foreign officers to join the emperor's
service was both an acquiescence to a, long-standing situation in the
civil war and a logical culmination of British policy.

The American

adventurer FTedrick Townsend Ward initially served the Chinese in an
unofficial capacity,

With a small force of mercenaries, he recaptured

Sungkiang in I860 for a group of local merchants.

In 1861, "he substi

tuted . . . a gradually increasing body of Chinese troops, drilled and
officered by foreigners. . . .

32

Bruce considered it impossible to

prevent foreigners from entering the Imperialists' ranks if the Chinese
were willing to employ them,

33

•
In 1861, Busaell had considered permit-

3'+
'ting British subjects to enter a foreign legion under the emperor,but this plan remained in abeyance until 1862. when the British became
convinced of the necessity and. viability of intervention.
Ward's force assisted the British against the Taipings at Nankiao
and K&oklao early in 1862, and henceforth was known as the "EverVictorious Army."

While the British sold munitions at cost to Ward* s

army, Russell instructed Bruce to press upon Prince Xung "the expedi
ency of the Chinese Government sparing no pains to raise the force under
Colonel Ward to ten thousand, and. to furnish him with the means of
35
equipping them for the field."
It was not merely Ward's success nor
the Taipings' threat to British interests that led the British to favor
the Ever-Victorious Army.
troops.

Ward did.much toward disciplining the Chinese

By assisting in army reform, he indirectly served the British
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without subjecting them to unwanted responsibility.

The Imperial

governments s policy of cooperation and invigoration of the army con
vinced the British that reform in China was practicable.

Ward's force

and Tseng Kuo-fan's resistance to using foreign troops perfectly fitted.
British desire to assist the government without incurring the expense
of sending a J.arge number of troops to China,.
was killed in action.

In September, 1862, Ward

His death created discipline problems in the

Ever-Victorious Array, and necessitated a search for a new coiiiaander.
Through Admiral Hope's recommendation, the American Henry
Burgevine assumed command of the Ever-Victorious Army.

While he was a

capable leader, Burgevine was tactless and distrusted, by Chinese
officers.

The British, however, cooperated with' him to secure the

army's continuation.

Admiral Hops "felt that it was absolutely neces

sary to give him some assistance with officers, until he shall have had
time to procure them, if it be desired to prevent the entire disorganiaaticn of the corps."-

Hope's efforts were useless.

Burgevine

quarrelled with his paymaster, and his relations with the Chinese
officers steadily worsened,
defected to the Taipings,
bim.

Burgevine was dismissed and eventually
An English officer, Captain Holland, replaced

With an Englishman in command and. their pay in arrears, th e

American officers became quarrelsome<

A threatened mutiny was averted

by payment of the troops, but the Ever-Victorious Army increasingly was
a source of friction between Chinese and foreigners.

Resolved to

protect the:ir interests, the British nevertheless committed themselves
to assist the government by licensing officers to join the emperor's
service.

Throughout 1863s, administrative problems of intervention plagued
British officials, who slowly realized the magnitude of their task.
Obstacles to reorganizing the Chinese army made Bruce despair of
achieving a. strong, centralized force.

The British experienced consid

erable difficulty in defining the role of officers in the Chinese
forces, which were unused to foreign discipline and methods of warfare.
In this phase of adjustment, the tenuous Sino-British alliance began to
weaken,, revealing the fundamental discontinuity between Chinese and
British interests.
"The object to be effected.," Bruce wrote, "is the substitution of
an improved military and na,val organization for the one hitherto used
in China.

I need not point out the impossibility of doing this

37
suddenly.'"

Reformation of the Chinese military, he noted, entailed

great expense to the central government, which simultaneously was paying
war-indemnities to France and Britain,

38

The British exacted a heavy

price for protection of Free Trade in China,

Indemnities and reform

placed a considerable financial burden on the Imperial government.
Payment of indemnities weakened the government that the British ardently
desired to regenerate through expensive reforms.
a contradiction in their policy.

Yet they did not see

Inconsistencies were overridden by an

appeal to the cause of Free Trade-, which Victorians regarded as a,..,boon
to Chinese civilization.
Anxious to impress the Chinese with the necessity of reform, Bruce
tactlessly denegrated the Imperial forces.

The Chinese contingents, he

said, "cannot face the rebels, and are invariably defeated, unless
supported by Foreign troops, or by Chinese disciplined by foreign
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officers,."'"

Sincere in his-desire to reform the Chinese military

system, Bruce because irritated as the government failed to accept his
recommendations.

At the end of the civil war, he predicted, "the

foreign officers will be dismissed; and the Chinese Force will revert
to its old condition of large numbers of men badly paid, badly led and
insufficiently equipped, and only fit to increase the pillage and
l\0

anarchy which they are unable to put down."

Consul Robertson was

equally discouraged by the problems of training Chinese troops in
European drill.

Despite his irritation at the slowness of reform,

Bruce preferred to continue the program of instruction for Chinese
Lip

troops, rather than assemble forces under foreign commanders. ~

While

Russell concurred with Bruce, he regarded the use. of foreign officers
as a temporary but necessary expedient.

He informed Bruce that the use

of foreign commanders "must be continued for the present and till
Shanghai is free from all danger of capture, but as a permanent system
ll/er/ M/ajesiv/'s Gcv/ernmen/t would much prefer that the Imperial

Gov/emmen/1 would be placed in a condition to defend its territories
43
by means of Chinese Officers a.nd Soldiers."
While training Chinese soldiers in European warfare, the English
became more involved with the Ever-Victorious Army.

With the queen's

license, and. at half-pay, British officers were permitted to serve

44

beyond the thirty-mile radius of Shanghai*

In March, I803, Major

Charles "Chinese" Gordon assumed command of the Ever-*Victorious Army.
Captain Holland's brief tenure had been fraught with defeats and
blunders, but Gordon was an unwelcome replacement, "The force was
sulky and mutinous, and did not wish an English officer; but . . .

99
/Gordon/ informed the officers , . . that they need not fear sweeping
changes or injury to their prospects; and they remained in their
45
duty."

He quickly won their respect through successful campaigns

against the Taipings.
Affiliation of English officers with the Chinese army created
unforeseen problems for Lord Bruce, the home government, and the com
manders themselves.

Eruce disavowed any responsibility for the actions

of British officers who served beyond the thirty-mile radius, and
wished to maintain strict control over the officers training Chinese
troops.

"Officers lent to discipline the Chinese . . . can only serve

for the protection of Shanghai, and the radius, and in improving the
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military organization of the Chinese."

Russell disagreed.

To support

his view, he mentioned that adequate control existed over all British
officers in China; the home government could simply recall "an imprudent
47
or ambitious Officer."

Bruce's policy rested upon a strong desire

to reform the Chinese troops, and to keep intervention to an absolute
minimum.

The home government's policy ostensibly accorded with Bruce's,

but Russell favored any measure designed to quell the rebellion, while
Bruce insisted upon the more far-reaching policy of reform.

As the

rebellion intensified and the Taipings fought more desperately, foreign
intervention became a greater interest to the home government than
Eruce's cautious policy of reform.
Unusual difficulties with the Chinese forces disrupted SinoBritish cooperation.
Taipings.-

The Imperialists showed no mercy to captured

To Tseng Kuo-fan, "these rebels . . . added to their rebel

lion against the Throne blasphemy . . . and disdain for the orthodox
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faith of the fathers; they were outside the pale of humanity, they were
48
a poison in the "body politic that- must be utterly eradicated."
The
Imperialists' cruelty to the Taipings appalled the British.

In 1862,

Russell had instructed Bruce to "impress on Prince Kung that if he
sanctions cruel and indiscriminate punishments he will entirely lose
49
the support of the British Authorities."

Bruce remonstrated the

Imperialists, but did not fulfill Russell's threat of withdrawing
British support.

50

Atrocities against the Taipings continued, and

later would have important repercussions for Sino-Briiish relations.
Gordon experienced problems with the Ever-Victorious Army.

As funds

for the troops frequently were in arrears, the army locted captured
cities as a guarantee of payment,

The force mutinied over a proposed

transfer of its headquarters, enraging Gordon.

"He was willing to

placate his men, as long as they behaved themselves; but unmilitary
conduct, a mutinous spirit4 and the subordination of a soldier's first
duty—fighting—to private interests—loot—were things he would not
si-and.

51

After disputing with a Chinese general, Gordon submitted his

resignation, but was persuaded to rescind it.

Difficulties between the

Chinese and British, however, merely multiplied.
Despite Gordon's problems with the Ever-Victorious Army, the home
government continued to rely upon it, placing little faith in the
ability of Chinese troops to safeguard British interests at Shanghai.
Although Major-General Brown proposed to withdraw his force from
Shanghai, complaining that the city was insalubrious, the home govern
ment strongly resisted his suggestion.

"Shanghae must not be abandoned;

it is believed that a million and a half of people are living there,

101
that British Trade at that Port is very great, & . . . important British
interests must not be neglected,"

52

Troops at Shanghai also provided

Gordon with an additional military safeguard, while the city was an
53
important source of supply for his army.

As fighting around Shanghai

intensified, Brown provided Gordon with troops to serve temporarily
beyond the thirty-mile radius. The British government approved his
expedient, wishing to avoid permitting full-pay officers at Shanghai to
enter the Chinese service.

The Secretary for War, however, desired that

Brown "afford every facility to officers who are willing to go on half
pay to join the force under Major Gordon."

54

As it appeared expedient,

the- British assumed greater responsibility in the war.

They wished to

assure the safety of the Ever-Victorious Army, which, together with, the
British regular forces protected Shanghai.

Reformation of the Chinese

army, impeded by military decentralization and the financial problems
of the Imperial government, did not serve the immediate interests of
the British.

An inconsistent policy toward reform was the result of

British willingness to use expedients in subduing the rebellion.
in 1864, continuing their earlier victories, the Imperial forces
defeated the Taipings.
an end.

Sino-British military cooperation hastened to

Circumstances which led to the disbanding of the Ever-Victori

ous Army illustrated the incompatibility of Chinese and British modes
of warfare.
purpose.

Beneath this difference in method lay an opposition of

The British intervened to protect their trade.

They consid

ered regeneration of the Imperial government through military training
a secondary goal.

The Chinese defended a world-view—Confucianism—and

a way of life which proved fundamentally opposed to the modernity the
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British wished them tc adopt.

The rebellion's aftermath, the abortive

T'uxig-chih Restoration, conclusively demonstrated the incompatibility of
Chinese -and British interests.
In the few months that remained "before the fall of Nanking,- the
rebels continued to fight for their lost cause. The Imperial forces
launched a dual campaign, fighting in Chekiang .province while besieging
Nanking.

The capture cf Ch'ang-chou in May, 1864, was one of the

Taipings' last struggles.

"It was taken by assault after a desperate

hand to hand fight which appears to have been continued in the streets
of the city. ... It is not surprising that a. place of such importance
. • . should have- been defended with & degree of desperation not
<c

ftitherto witnessed."'

In June, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan died at Nanking.

following month, the city fell to the Imperial forces.

The

Although

remnants of -the Taipings joined other rebel bands, the T'ai-p'ing T'ienkuo was destroyed.
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Throughout the last ca.mpa.igns, relations between Gordon and the
Imperial commanders steadily deteriorated.

After the recapture of

Soochow in December, I863, several Taiping chiefs surrendered.

With

Gordon's sanction, Governor Li had promised them clemency.

Li, however,

revoked his promise and ordered the chiefs to be executed.

Enraged,

Gordon again threatened to resign.

Through Robert Halt's mediation,

Gordon agreed to retain his command and took part in the capture cf
Ch'ang-~ehou.

Subordinated to autonomous provincial commanders, Gordon

held no authority.

His terms of service prevented any long-term

cooperation with provincial generals, who were jealous of their power,
"vjhile licensed to serve the emperor, Gordon actually served the
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provincial authorities.

British policy was contradictory, as the

Ever-Victorious Army undermined the centralisation they desired to
foster.

Angered "by Li!s conduct, and unable to halt the progress of

military decentralization, the British withdrew their officers from the
57
emperor's service."'

As a result of the usual delay in communication,

Gordon remained in the Chinese service until June, when the troublesome
Ever-Victorious Army was disbanded.

Gordon's force operated within a

limited area, largely around Shanghai.

The army helped protect British

interests at Shanghai, and from the English perspective, this limited
intervention was both expedient and successful.

As part of the broader

program of reform, however, the Ever-Victorious Array was a gross
failure-

The British pragmatically chose a course of intervention best

suited to their immediate interests, unintentionally abetting decentral
ization.
.After disbandiaent of the Ever-Victorious Army, the English coolly
reassessed their interests in China.

Bruce conferred with the official

Wen-hsiang, to discuss their future policy.

His suggestions and obser

vations focused largely upon the safety of British interests.

He

"pointed out that their policy ought to be to render secure . . . /the/
great centres of trade and revenue, and have as few other strong
58
positions as possible."'

Wen-hsiang desired to protect the port cities

with Manchu forces, to avoid initiating Chinese in the use of foreign
59
weapons and military techniques."

He clearly wished to retain as much

central authority as possible, a policy agreeable to Bruce.

The author--

it3.es, Bruce observed, foresaw "difficulty in disposing of the
provincial levies which have been called out to make head against the

10'jinsurrecticn and this apprehension of . , . these men turning against
the Government , , „ confirms me in the opinion that, we have nothing to
fear from any aggressive policy on the part of the Manchoo Govern60
ment."

Bruce was aware that provincialism would weaken the dynastyj

he suggested that, customs revenue and foreign inspectors be used to
6l
check local authorities.

The Maritime Customs system and its agents

would serve to unite the British and Chinese governments, simultane
ously strengthening the dynasty and serving British interests.
Bruce's desire to reform the Chinese military had considerably
62
weakened before the rebellion ended.
Military decentralization
intensified during the Taiping Rebellion, and Bruce correctly observed
that the process would be exceedingly difficult to reverse.

While he

realized that provincial authorities wielded great military and
63
political power,
he assumed, that, the central government eventually
could restore its authority in the provinces.

He shared Gordon's

opinion that the Imperial troops "are no longer the inefficient Rabble
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they used to be. . , ."
His assessment was highly optimistic.
government's green-banner forces remained incompetent.

The

Although the

authorities attempted to consolidate the militia and the Imperial army,
they failed.

"Provincial armies and the regular green-banner troops

existed side try side.

All that the government accomplished was a

blunting of the militia development, resulting in an increasing general
65
military weakness by the end. of the century."

While provincial

militarization initially weakened the central government after the
rebellion, eventually China's entire military system lapsed into
disarray, leading to unprecedented humiliation later in the century.
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Brucecs program of reform could not reverse decentralization, nor could
he halt the progress of the Ever-Victorious Army, although he disap
proved of using British officers beyond the radius of Shanghai.

British

intervention was calculated to serve, and did. serve, British interests.
The short-sightedness of British policy and obstacles to centralization
negated the program of reform.
As the Talping Rebellion drew to an end, the British renewed
their interest In trade.

The defeat of the rebel forces gratified the

British desire for a restoration of commerce.

Trade on the Yangtze

Biver increased,^ and silk cultivation slowly revived.

"The mulberry

trees in the silk producing districts were left unpruned, the inhabi
tants being afraid to resume their occupation.

But as soon as Hang-chow-

foo was taken, they began to make their appearance, and the fields were
filled with individuals pruning the trees.

After reestablishment of

Imperial authority; the British confidently expected a revival of the
silk trade.

The rebellion, however, mined China's silk export| Japan

and Italy gradually assumed control of the silk market.
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Wars,

treaties, and intervention in the rebellion, all for the sake of trade,
had created diplomatic ties between the Chinese a.nd English governments.
Despite the rebellion's adverse effect upon trade, the British could
not easily abandon their interests in China.
"The objects of trading countries such as Great Britain . . . are
not incompatible with the interests or dignity of China or her Govern6Q

ment, , . ."' Bruce's enthusiasm seemed appropriate in the aftermath
of the Taiping Rebellion.

While the Chinese had uniquely adapted to

Western diplomacy, British officials were willing to respect Chinese
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customs and. advocated a policy of reform and compromise.

Despite the

aura of cooperation between the Chinese and British governments, their
interests fundamentally were opposed.

During the Taiping Rebellion,

the Chinese defended the Confucian way of life, and the British defended
trade.

The uneasy Sino-British alliance rested upon unification of

incompatible oppc-sites, Confucianism and modernity.

The Chinese

secondarily assisted the British in protecting their trade interests,
as the British cooperated with the Chinese to avert destruction of
their society.

Sino-British cooperation in the Taiping Rebellion

proved a feeble link between two nations with divergent interests.

The

unity of Chinese and British interests was superficial and coincidental.
The tenuous Sino-British alliance inaugurated during the Taiping
Rebellion slowly dissolved, and finally vanished in the Boxer Rebellion.
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CONCLUSION

At mid-nineteenth century, Free Trade had assumed the guise of a
universal panacea for international relations. In opening China to
trade, the Victorians saw themselves conferring material and, social
benefits upon the Chinese.

Yet in forcing Westernization upon the

Chinese, the Victorians failed to discern tneir own self-righteousness.
Determined to bring China into the sphere of contemporary diplomatic
and economic relations, the British dismissed China's historic tribute
system as an anachronism.

Through wars and treaties based upon Western

principles of international relations, the British gradually brought
the Imperial government into modernity.

The British experience in

China began as an economic venture, but the establishment of Free Trade
entailed unforeseeable legal, diplomatic, and political problems.

The

Nanking and Tientsin treaties were provisional solutions to the problems
of the China trade, which in turn created new difficulties as the
English became dissatisfied with the Chinese response to Western
principles of commerce.

Sino-British treaties were only the initial

step toward the modernization of China,, as the English gradually
realized from their experience with the Imperial government,
Through the circumstances which led to Chinese acceptance of the
treaties, the Manchu and British governments slowly developed a policy
of cooperation.
alliance,

The Taiping Rebellion strengthened the Sino-British

Seen against the background of the. rebels' fanaticism and
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destructiveness., the Manchus appeared, defenders of the stability that
British economic interests depended upon.

Although they long-professed

neutrality, the British tacitly favored the Imperial cause, as they
were "bound to the central government by the treaties.

The Manchus1

belated pro-foreignism and governmental reform, coupled with, the
treaties, gave them a decisive advantage over the rebels in winning
British support.

The British therefore dismissed, the Taipings" pro-

foreignism and. Rung Jen-kan's reforms as empty gestures.

The British

intervened on the government's behalf when they were convinced that
reform was hopeless among the Taipings and practicable for the Manchus.
By serving the interests of a reformed administration, British prestige
rexaain e& intact.
British intervention in the Taiping Rebellion exemplified
"informal" imperialism.
control of China.

The British avoided assuming direct political

They preferred to cooperate with indigenous author

ities, evading the expense and difficulties of formal control.

The

Taiping Bebellion indicated the problems of a debilitated adminstration.
As a result of the government * s weakness, the British were forced to
assume unwanted political responsibility to safeguard, their commercial
interests.

In pursuit of economic enterprise, the British, encountered

a series of local economic problems which increasingly required polit
ical solutions.

These temporary solutions to local problems conflicted

with the long-range British policy of evading political responsibility.
The British therefore attempted, to place the duty of governing back
upon the Chinese.

Their interests, however, compelled them to assume

an advisory role in the process of regenerating the Imperial government.
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While the British had no desire to incur governmental responsibility in
China, they required political stability to ensure the security of their
economic interests, which gradually drew them into involvement with
upholding the sovereignty of the Manchu dynasty. The inconsistent,
provisional character of informal imperialism in China demonstrated
the pragmatism of mid-Victorian foreign policy.
Prior to ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin, the British had
favored the Imperial cause, yet their policy largely developed as an
unplanned product of local and temporary circumstances.

Upon achieving

ratif.ica.tIon, the British hesitated to intervene; they did not follow
a rigid plan of supporting the dynasty.

Although their influence over

the Imperial authorities became stronger as a result .of the rebellion,
the British did not pursue a course designed to weaken the government
l>y causing it to rely upon the foreign powers for assistance,

British

officials wished to take some part in China's government, and to keep
it from becoming strong enough to resist foreign influence.

Yet their

foremost consideration remained the protection of Free Trade, which
required a modicum of stability and strength for the Imperial govern
ment, to prevent further disasters such as the Taiping Rebellion. The
British program, of reform and limited intervention, although based upon
protection of Free Trade, was meant to redound to the credit of the
Imperial government.
A eoiraaon interest in restoring the stability of China united
British, and Chinese authorities. To reestablish their sovereignty, the
Manchus had to reassert Confucianism, the conservative ideology of
Chinese society.

Yet -Confucianism proved incompatible with the program
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o£ gradual modernization which the British advocated to maintain their
trade interests.

The opposition of the dynasty's political interests

and British economic interests "became increasingly evident throughout
the nineteenth century, and culminated in Chins.5 s humiliation under the
Boxer Protocol,
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